University of South Florida

Scholar Commons
Graduate Theses and Dissertations

Graduate School

2006

Considering security in Florida's transportation
project development process
Phillip W. Stevens
University of South Florida

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the American Studies Commons
Scholar Commons Citation
Stevens, Phillip W., "Considering security in Florida's transportation project development process" (2006). Graduate Theses and
Dissertations.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/2714

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact
scholarcommons@usf.edu.

Considering Security in Florida’s
Transportation Project Development Process

by

Phillip W. Stevens, P.E., AICP

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Civil Engineering
Department of Civil Engineering
College of Engineering
University of South Florida

Major Professor: Ram Pendyala, Ph.D.
Jian “John” Lu, Ph.D.
Edward Mierzejewski, Ph.D.
Steven Polzin, Ph.D.
Stuart Silverman, Ph.D.

Date of Approval:
March 31, 2006

Keywords: planning, alternatives, PD&E, NEPA, screening
© Copyright 2006, Phillip W. Stevens, P.E., AICP

Dedication

This research effort and this degree are dedicated to my family. It is
dedicated to the sacrifice of time and attention that they have made to allow
this success. It is dedicated to my wife Lisa who has gone for periods of time
without her husband and to my children Lauren, Andrew, Alex, Jared, and
Ryan who have gone for periods of time without their father. It is dedicated to
my mother Charlene who always made me “finish the game” no matter how
much I wanted to quit.

Acknowledgements

This research effort is the culmination of 14 years of effort in pursuit of
knowledge. It would not have been possible without the support of many
people and agencies over the years. The faculty and staff of the University of
South Florida have continuously supported this effort and through their
professionalism and love of education, made this accomplishment possible.
Special recognition is given to Dr. Frank Young for mentorship during
undergraduate studies, Dr. Anita Callahan, P.E. for mentorship during the
pursuit of a Master’s Degree, and Dr. Ram Pendyala, E.I. for guidance and
mentorship during pursuit of this Doctorate Degree. These individuals have
sacrificed their own time and energy to ensure the success of this effort.
Recognition is given to Dr. Jian “John” Lu, P.E., Dr. Edward Mierzejewski,
P.E., Dr. Steven Polzin, P.E., and Dr. Stuart Silverman for their participation,
expert guidance, and commitment to make this effort succeed.

This effort has been supported by my employers including the Florida
Department of Transportation, Parsons Brinckerhoff Quade and Douglas,
Inc., AIM Engineering & Surveying, Inc., and MACTEC Engineering and
Consulting, Inc.

These companies have both encouraged and supported

continuing education through their policies and practices.
support, this endeavor would not have been possible.

Without their

Table Of Contents
List Of Tables ....................................................................................................... v
List Of Figures ......................................................................................................vi
Abstract .............................................................................................................. viii
Chapter 1 Introduction And Approach .................................................................. 1
1.1

Problem Statement ......................................................................... 1

1.2

Purpose And Objectives.................................................................. 2

1.3

Value Of Research.......................................................................... 2

1.4

Significance..................................................................................... 3

1.5

Scope Of Study ............................................................................... 4
1.5.1 Content Limitations.............................................................. 4
1.5.2 Spatial Limitations ............................................................... 4
1.5.3 Temporal Limitations ........................................................... 4
1.5.4 Contextual Limitations ......................................................... 5

1.6

Consumers Of Research................................................................. 5

1.7

Methodology ................................................................................... 6
1.7.1 Data Instrument ................................................................... 9

1.8

Study Organization........................................................................ 12

i

Chapter 2 Literature Review ............................................................................... 15
2.1

Emerging Transportation Security Issues ..................................... 16

2.2

General Planning Needs ............................................................... 23

2.3

Modal Integration .......................................................................... 26

2.4

Mode Attractiveness...................................................................... 28

2.5

System Redundancy ..................................................................... 29

2.6

Application Of Technology ............................................................ 30

2.7

Cost And Funding Priorities .......................................................... 38

2.8

System Performance..................................................................... 43

2.9

System Interdependency .............................................................. 44

2.10

Land Use Interaction ..................................................................... 48

2.11

Risk Assessment........................................................................... 49

2.12

Public Participation........................................................................ 52

2.13

Information Availability .................................................................. 53

2.14

Planning Levels: Federal, State, Local......................................... 54

2.15

Organizational Structure ............................................................... 59

2.16

Legal Considerations .................................................................... 60

2.17

Facility Design............................................................................... 62

Chapter 3 Framework For Security Planning...................................................... 63
3.1

Florida’s Existing Project Development Processes ....................... 65
3.1.1 Existing Initialization Phase ............................................... 69
3.1.2 Existing Data Collection Phase.......................................... 73
ii

3.1.3 Existing Analysis Phase..................................................... 76
3.1.4 Existing Finalization Phase................................................ 83
3.1.5 Existing Informational Phase ............................................. 86
3.1.6 Existing Public Involvement Considerations ...................... 87
Chapter 4 Survey Results And Analysis ............................................................. 89
4.1

State Request Letter ..................................................................... 89
4.1.1 State Request Letter Responses....................................... 90
4.1.2 Request Letter Analysis..................................................... 93

4.2

Online Questionnaire .................................................................... 95

Chapter 5 Revised Project Development Process.............................................. 96
5.1

Revised Initialization Phase .......................................................... 98

5.2

Revised Data Collection Phase................................................... 104

5.3

Revised Analysis Phase.............................................................. 106

5.4

Revised Finalization Phase......................................................... 117

5.5

Revised Informational Phase ...................................................... 118

5.6

Revised Public Involvement Considerations ............................... 119

Chapter 6 Findings And Next Steps ................................................................. 122
6.1

Key Findings ............................................................................... 122
6.1.1 Security Evaluation Criteria ............................................. 123
6.1.2 Agency Review Involvement............................................ 123
6.1.3 Revision/Clarification Of Public Involvement ................... 124

iii

6.2

Next Steps .................................................................................. 125
6.2.1 Validation......................................................................... 125
6.2.2 Implementation ................................................................ 127
6.2.3 Future Research Needs................................................... 129
6.2.4 Local Participation ........................................................... 129
6.2.5 National Applicability Of Research .................................. 131

References ....................................................................................................... 133
Bibliography...................................................................................................... 143
Appendices....................................................................................................... 149
Appendix A: Acronyms.......................................................................... 150
Appendix B: List Of State Security Contacts......................................... 156
Appendix C: Request Letter.................................................................. 164
Appendix D: State Responses To Inquiry Letter ................................... 167
Appendix E: Key Transportation Legislation ......................................... 175
Appendix F: Transportation Planning And Security Agencies............... 185
About The Author ................................................................................... End Page

iv

List Of Tables

Table 1-1 Research Beneficiaries......................................................................... 5
Table 2-1 Vulnerability Assessment Scenarios................................................... 21
Table 2-2 FBI Funding For FY2005 .................................................................... 43
Table 2-3 Transit Risk Levels ............................................................................. 51
Table 2-4 Location Of Attacks On Public Transportation Systems ..................... 58
Table 3-1 COA Impact Factors ........................................................................... 76
Table 3-2 Standard PD&E Evaluation Criteria .................................................... 79
Table 3-3 Suggested DEIS And FEIS Reviewers ............................................... 85
Table 4-1 Request Letter Responses ................................................................. 90
Table 5-1 Recommended Security Agency Reviewers..................................... 107
Table 5-2 Security Evaluation Criteria .............................................................. 112
Table 6-1 Minimum Data Collection.................................................................. 131
Table A-1 List Of Acronyms…………………………………………………………150
Table B-1 List Of State Security Contacts…………………………………...…….……....156

v

List Of Figures

Figure 2-1 Typical Project Process..................................................................... 62
Figure 3-1 Safety Legislation/Regulations .......................................................... 64
Figure 3-2 Key Transportation Planning Agencies ............................................. 65
Figure 3-3 Florida’s Existing Project Development Process ............................... 68
Figure 3-4 Decision Process for AN Process Applicability.................................. 70
Figure 3-5 Advance Notification Fact Sheet ....................................................... 71
Figure 3-6 Class of Action Form – Page 3.......................................................... 75
Figure 3-7 COA Discussion Items ...................................................................... 77
Figure 3-8 Corridor Preservation Procedure....................................................... 78
Figure 3-9 Evaluation Matrix Criteria .................................................................. 83
Figure 4-1 State Request Letter Response ........................................................ 94
Figure 4-2 Online Questionnaire Observations................................................... 95
Figure 5-1 Revised Project Development Process ............................................. 97
Figure 5-2 Project Type Exclusion Modification.................................................. 98
Figure 5-3 AN Response System Modification ................................................... 99
Figure 5-4 AN Fact Sheet Modification............................................................. 100
Figure 5-5 Modified AN Form ........................................................................... 100
Figure 5-6 Graphical Exhibit Modification ......................................................... 101
vi

Figure 5-7 LAP Program Modification............................................................... 102
Figure 5-8 Private Development Modification ................................................... 103
Figure 5-9 Local Comprehensive Planning Modification................................... 104
Figure 5-10 COA Form Modification ................................................................. 105
Figure 5-11 Modified COA Form....................................................................... 105
Figure 5-12 Corridor Analysis Modification ....................................................... 106
Figure 5-13 ETDM Modification ........................................................................ 107
Figure 5-14 ETAT Membership Modification .................................................... 108
Figure 5-15 GIS Layer Modification .................................................................. 109
Figure 5-16 Evaluation Matrix Modification....................................................... 110
Figure 5-17 Evaluation Factors Modification .................................................... 111
Figure 5-18 Environmental Document Review Modification ............................. 117
Figure 5-19 Security Documentation Modification ............................................ 118
Figure 5-20 Final Distribution Modification ....................................................... 119
Figure 5-21 Public Involvement Modification .................................................... 120
Figure 5-22 Information Dissemination Modification......................................... 121

vii

Considering Security in Florida’s
Transportation Project Development Process
Phillip W. Stevens, P.E., AICP

ABSTRACT

The transportation decision-making process takes on different forms in
different states.

The purpose of this study was to include and move

considerations for national, state, and local security needs into the transportation
project development arenas with a focus on Florida. A thorough and updated
literature review was completed to determine the current state of the industry
regarding incorporating security considerations into the transportation planning
process. A review of current Federal, State, and Local laws and regulations
concerning planning requirements was conducted to outline planning parameters
and limitations. An information request letter was mailed to the key planning staff
members for all 50 states in the United States, the District of Columbia and
Puerto Rico and other key stakeholders. An online survey was conducted to
determine public opinion about transportation security.

As a result of these

efforts, a modified PD&E process was developed, key findings were identified,
future research needs were defined, and an outline of next steps was developed.

viii

Chapter 1
Introduction And Approach

1.1

Problem Statement

Federal Code defines terrorism as “Terrorism includes the unlawful use of
force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a
government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of
political or social objectives.” (Code of Federal Regulations, Title 28, Volume 1,
Section 0.85, July 1, 2004). United States Code defines security as “Protection
from terrorist threats or actions due to acts of extreme violence resulting in
significant loss of life, injury, and/or damage or destruction of facilities and
infrastructure, whether or not these acts are intended to further political or social
objectives.” (United States Code, Title 18, Part 1, Chapter 113B, Section
2331(5), January 7, 2003).

The transportation decision-making process takes on different forms in
different states. There are clear federal guidelines that motivate and facilitate
these processes.

However, these guidelines lack provisions for security

considerations in the transportation planning and decision-making processes. As
with other issues, such as landscaping and Intelligent Transportation Systems
1

(ITS), that have historically migrated through the project cycle backwards, there
is a high potential for security considerations to take the same path. This path
would involve beginning in a retrofit, operations, and/or maintenance phase and
proceeding backwards through asset acquisition, design, programming, and
finally residing in the planning process.

1.2

Purpose And Objectives

The purpose of this study was to include and move considerations for
national, state, and local security needs into the transportation planning arena,
specifically into Florida’s Project Development Process. They currently exist in
the operational phases of projects but are not involved in early project phases.
This study accomplished this through the development of a set of guidelines for
planners and decision-makers to use when developing and screening reasonable
and feasible projects and alternatives and when implementing their planning and
work programs.

1.3

Value Of Research

Specific benefits of these guidelines include:


Established

a

methodology

for

transportation security.
2

comparing

alternatives

regarding



Can justify management decisions for altering programming, budgeting, and
staffing assignments that may differ from previous norms.



Encouraged identification of technical and research needs in transportation
security planning.



Increased efficiency and effectiveness of transportation decision-making by
educating decision-makers on potential fatal flaws.



Allowed for the information to be used in other similar situations, such as
natural disasters.

1.4

Significance

This study can be used to provide specific recommendations for inclusion
of security considerations into the transportation planning process that would
have an immediate utility at various levels (i.e., federal, state, local) throughout
Florida. This study can facilitate planning efforts between these levels and result
in an additional screening tool that can be used to evaluate potential
transportation projects and more accurately assess the benefits and costs of
those alternatives.

This study can also be used as instructional material for

training those decision-makers on security sensitivity in the planning and project
development phases.

3

1.5

Scope Of Study

1.5.1 Content Limitations

The content of this study was limited to that material that could be
researched, documented, printed, reproduced, presented in any form, and
discussed without violating any federal, state, or local laws, including those
policies and procedures relating to issues of security.

1.5.2 Spatial Limitations

This study examined the transportation project development process as it
exists in the State of Florida.

Even though some discussion concerning the

methodologies and status of decision-making initiatives of other states occurred,
this study focused on Florida.

1.5.3 Temporal Limitations

The topic of this study is rapidly developing.

The most current and

available information was used during the life of this study. However, due to the
significance of this topic in the project development process, and the current
cultural sensitivities that may exist regarding the topic of security, this topic will
continue to develop for several years.

4

1.5.4 Contextual Limitations

The application of the guidelines established during this study will primarily
apply to the current transportation project development process in Florida. It can
be expected that certain elements of the guidelines will be universally applicable
but other elements will only apply to the conditions within Florida. In addition, the
research was limited to those issues that are not currently developed within the
industry.

1.6

Consumers Of Research

This effort will prove beneficial to a large number of consumers (Table
1-1).

Table 1-1
Research Beneficiaries
1. Federal, state, and local policy makers
2. Key project staff involved in Project Development &
Environment (PD&E) studies or other similar National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) studies
3. Staff involved in work program development and
maintenance
4. Designated safety staff at all levels
5. Designated security staff at all levels
6. Transportation planners
7. Transportation consultants
8. Transportation system managers
9. Elected officials and appointees
10. Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPO’s) and their staff

5

1.7

Methodology

The development of transportation planning strategies that include
enhanced

security

considerations

requires

tremendous

commitment

to

developing models for implementation over the long term. Specifically, there is
considerable evidence to suggest that many transportation planning processes
are weak and are ill-prepared to manage the needs of today’s users without
extensive modifications to processes and procedures. Unfortunately, with the
continuous threats of violence, terrorism and other criminal behaviors in the
United States, transportation systems have become increasingly vulnerable to
these challenges. As a result, effective strategies must be developed that will
accommodate the needs of users around the country. For the purposes of this
chapter, Florida transportation planning systems will serve as the primary focus
of this research study, with an emphasis placed upon the ability to develop
effective security methods and processes that will lead to safer routes. The
methodology for the proposed research study will employ a qualitative method of
research, as this will require extensive attention to the quality of the processes
currently in place, which will lead to new conclusions regarding the development
of new and enhanced programs that will promote security at an even greater
level.
6

Any research study involving transportation planning processes requires
that there must be a thorough and comprehensive evaluation of existing
strategies in order to identify areas that require improvements, as well as the
direction in which these processes should lead in the future.

There is

considerable evidence throughout transportation planning to suggest that the
quality of these strategies and their cohesiveness with existing transportation
channels is a key indicator of their likelihood of success or failure. For example,
if a program exists that does not provide effective measures for promoting and
enhancing security, then it is very likely that transportation security planning is
doomed for failure in one way or another. Therefore, strategic measures must be
taken that will enable transportation planners to develop processes that are
designed to fill the voids of current processes, emphasizing security-enhancing
measures that are seriously lacking in many modern systems.

The level of security that is provided by a transportation system is perhaps
the key measurement that transportation planners must consider in today's world.
Since there are many threats to the livelihood and integrity of transportation
systems, there is an important lesson to be learned with regards to the
development of security measures that will offer passengers the best possible
sense of comfort and ease in their travels. Regardless of the location across the
United States, transportation planning has become a tricky and complex

7

phenomenon, whereby there are considerable challenges for planners in the
areas of strategic development and security administration. Despite government
and local influence, there are a number of challenges with respect to modifying
systems to accommodate changing needs, and therefore, it is critical that the
appropriate methods are utilized in order to accomplish the desired tasks. The
proposed research study will define the overall effectiveness of a multidimensional transportation planning system in promoting a greater understanding
of the needs of communities and leaders, as well as to address major security
issues and complications that might ensue during planning and implementation.

The

following

efforts

were

completed

to

determine

the

current

transportation planning practice, possible arenas to incorporate security
considerations, possible methodologies to incorporate security considerations,
and effectiveness of those methodologies to properly consider security in the
planning process:


A thorough and updated literature review to determine the current state of the
industry regarding incorporating security considerations into the transportation
planning process.



A review of current Federal, State, and Local laws and regulations concerning
planning requirements was conducted to outline planning parameters and
limitations.
8



An information request letter was mailed to the key planning staff members
for all 50 states in the United States, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico
and other key stakeholder in Florida.

The responses received were then

used to assess the current condition and/or need for this study in the planning
practices currently underway in their respective states. The responses were
also used to determine staging scenarios involving deployment nationwide.


An online questionnaire (http://home.earthlink.net/~securityplanning/) was
developed and administered to obtain general perceptions about the
transportation planning process and security concerns.

The survey was

distributed, via email notification, in January of 2006 to about 500 recipients,
all of whom reside in Florida. The recipients were comprised of planners,
engineers, and private citizens.

The responses were used to determine

perceived needs in the transportation planning process, as related to security
considerations.


Interviews were conducted with leading transportation officials and private
security experts to develop initial guidelines and to determine effectiveness
and utility of proposed modifications to the existing process.

1.7.1 Data Instrument

For the purposes of this study, a questionnaire provided the most
interesting prospects for feedback and real-time data for consideration.
9

The

questionnaire addressed various aspects of transportation planning at various
stages of commitment, incorporating the necessity to implement enhanced
security measures that will provide additional protection against a variety of
events that could potentially lead to harm or damage to system infrastructures.

The questionnaire involved questions that required a simple yes or no
response. Responses varied depending upon their role in the process and their
assessment of current conditions.

The questionnaire instrument required a

specific method of implementation in order to obtain a wide variety of responses
and important results for consideration. For the purposes of this study, it was
estimated that an online questionnaire would offer the most effective means of
gathering data and obtaining a wide variety of responses from participants all
over the State of Florida. The advantages of this method included the following:

1. These types of surveys are relatively inexpensive;
2. Limited

personal

information

was

required

for

dissemination

to

participants; and
3. Online questionnaires enabled participants to have more time than in
other strategies, where there may be specific time constraints in place.

Since the questionnaires required some thought and consideration of a
number of transportation-related issues, the researcher provided ample time for

10

completion and submission of these surveys. The research study required that
these questionnaires discuss a number of issues relative to transportation
planning, strategic development, as well as current and future needs.

The

questionnaires made available to participants were identical in nature, and
therefore, all questions were simple yet specific enough to provide sufficient
detailed information for examination and evaluation. Since the target participant
population was educated and possessed an acceptable level of intelligence,
these questionnaires did not present too many challenges in terms of completion.
Each questionnaire contained questions that could be divided into three sections,
with a section emphasizing each of the following primary issues:

1. Security;
2. Perceptions of Transportation Planning; and
3. Federal, State, and Local support strategies

The questionnaire was developed as a 30-item scale, with questions
related to each designated section. Participants were required to complete all
questions in order to have their responses counted as valid in the evaluation
process. Each questionnaire was brief, with a short explanation at the beginning
of the online form to discuss the specifics of the submission process. Emails
were sent to various State and Local agencies throughout the state with links to
the questionnaire site, as well as a disclaimer regarding the confidentiality of this
11

information. No names or other personal information were used in the study with
the exception of the individual’s affiliation or relationship to transportation
planning, and these records will remain confidential at all times. It was critical that
each participant was notified of confidentiality, since there were concerns
regarding the content of the questionnaire or liability or perceived endorsement
related to their answers. The protection of each participant's identity was of
primary concern for the researcher, and therefore, great lengths were taken to
promote confidentiality at all times throughout the process.

1.8

Study Organization

This study is organized as follows:


Chapter 1 - Introduction and Approach: This chapter includes a discussion of
the problem statement, value and significance of research, study limitations,
and methodology.



Chapter 2 - Literature Review: This chapter documents the state of practice
as determined by a thorough literature review.



Chapter 3 - Framework for Security Planning:

This chapter outlines the

legislative and regulatory instruments involved in security planning along with
agencies involved in the process and the current project development
process.
12



Chapter 4 – Survey Results: This chapter includes analysis and discussion of
results obtained from the information request letter mailed to the state
Department’s of Transportation and analysis and discussion of results
obtained from the security planning questionnaire that was administered
online.



Chapter 5 - Revised Project Development Process: This chapter reflects the
new and revised PD&E process that explicitly incorporates security
considerations into the process



Chapter 6 - Conclusions and Recommendations: This chapter summarizes
the study by stating conclusions about the research and recommendations for
improvement to the planning process and recommendations for further
research.



References:

This section contains references to all literature quoted or

referenced in this study.


Bibliography:

This section contains references to all literature that was

studied, but not directly used, in this study.


Appendix A – Acronyms: This appendix defines all acronyms used in the
study and report.



Appendix B – List of State Security Contacts: This appendix lists all of the
recipients of the initial request letter.

13



Appendix C – Sample Request Letter to State Planning Agencies:

This

appendix presents a sample of the request letter that was sent to all planning
agencies as listed in Appendix B.


Appendix D – State Responses to Inquiry Letter: This appendix documents
all responses from the request letters.



Appendix E – Key Transportation Legislation:

This appendix contains a

description of key transportation legislation and regulations.


Appendix F - Transportation Planning and Security Agencies: This appendix
contains a description of key transportation agencies involved in the
transportation planning process.



About the Author: This section gives an overview of the author.

14

Chapter 2
Literature Review

There are many challenges involved in maintaining an effective and
secure transportation system in modern society, and therefore, it is often very
difficult to identify resources and strategies for improving these processes without
specific attention to past research and case studies regarding the proposed topic.
For the purposes of this study, existing research regarding security issues in
transportation was evaluated for contribution to new strategies for improvement
in this arena, and specifically, research concerning the State of Florida was
particularly advantageous in promoting change and progress.

The following

discussion will identify and evaluate various resources from existing literature
that provided insights into security and safety concerns in modern transportation
systems throughout the State.

As a part of this study, an in-depth literature review was conducted to
determine the state-of-the-industry with regards to transportation security
planning. This review included obtainable literature, both written and online, from
a variety of sources including government, education, and industry. As a result
of that review, several topic areas emerged. Even though all of these topics are

15

not fully explored as a part of this study, they must be considered in the
transportation planning process.

2.1

Emerging Transportation Security Issues

A report generated by Dillingham (2003) identifies many of the emerging
threats to and concerns of modern transportation systems, which have
significantly increased since September 11th. During the identification process,
many weaknesses in security have been noted, including flaws in the luggage
screening process at airports, easy access to restricted areas at airports, and
limitations in air traffic control towers with respect to security measures
(Dillingham 2003). With these weaknesses in mind, it is not surprising that the
federal government continues to reassess its priorities with respect to homeland
security and transportation protection, and substantial measures have been
taken to ensure that these problems are resolved and new solutions are
implemented on a long-term basis (Dillingham 2003).

With

respect

to

mass

transit

alternatives,

the

Federal

Transit

Administration (FTA) established its own set of security initiatives in order to
accommodate the needs of passengers and these systems as a whole
(Dillingham 2003). Furthermore, it has been suggested that funding for transit
security initiatives should be allocated from a variety of resources as a means of
16

facilitating new strategies for security improvements across these systems
(Dillingham 2003).

However, the challenges of enhancing security in

transportation systems continue to cause concern in federal, state and local
agencies, although immediate and long-term planning initiatives involving risk
assessments have been created (Dillingham 2003).

However, there are

additional considerations with regards to funding such programs, as there is
limited funding in place, which is far below the projected estimates required to
fund these strategies (Dillingham 2003). Furthermore, it is necessary to consider
that human contributions to enhancing transportation planning processes are just
as significant as financial considerations, as the knowledge and expertise that
these contributors bring to the mix are critical to the long-term development of
key

strategic

initiatives

in

transportation

planning

(Dillingham

2003).

Nonetheless, transportation security initiatives are still in their infancy stages, as
there are still marked vulnerabilities across these channels that are difficult to
ignore:

“Today,

we

have

better

intelligence,

coordination,

and

communication; we have plans to alert the public to threats; and we
are all more alert to the possibility of threats.

Yet major

vulnerabilities remain, particularly in air cargo, general aviation,
mass transit, and port security…Addressing these vulnerabilities

17

will continue to require risk assessments and plans that balance
security concerns against mobility needs, and that consider how
much the nation can afford to spend for security improvements in
light of other, competing demands for limited funds” (Dillingham
2003).

These challenges continue to provide particularly difficult circumstances
for transportation planners, and although the federal government possesses
considerable influence in advancing these objectives, they also serve as a
limiting factor in inciting change and progress, due in large part to the lack of
funding for such programs on a widespread basis (Dillingham 2003). It appears
that in many instances, limited funding opportunities are secured for only larger
metropolitan.

However, there are many other regions throughout the United

States that also face abundant threats of different types that require the attention
and financial resources of the federal government in order to advance security
measures into the coming years.

The optimization of resources serves as a key indicator of advanced
initiatives for transportation planning processes.

Berrick (2005) argues that

continuous federal funding for transportation security initiatives requires that the
President, Congress and the Senate must agree upon the key objectives for
promoting advanced security capabilities in all types of transportation systems.
18

However, it should be noted that by integrating resources from all agencies into
one cooperative system is likely to serve as the most feasible alternative in
advancing transportation security initiatives to the next level (Berrick 2005).
Therefore, the consolidation of efforts from one agency to the next is one of the
most effective strategies in developing a cohesive effort that will facilitate
transportation planning as desired (Berrick 2005).

It is often necessary to

reconstruct programs or strategies from the ground up in advancing these
objectives; however, this strategy requires extensive time, capital and other
resources that might not be readily available for use (Berrick 2005). Therefore, it
is possible that integrating new models and strategies one at a time is perhaps
the most effective strategy to ensure that transportation planning progresses to
the next level without falling behind in the process (Berrick 2005). With this in
mind, it is important to identify the critical steps in advancing transportation
planning to the next level, achieving those steps on an individual basis, and then
moving on to more advanced initiatives as time and funding permit (Berrick
2005). Transportation planners must assume responsibility for their actions and
must affirm their commitment to these strategies as a primary means of
advancing transportation to a new level, one that will provide the best possible
outcomes for the end users (Berrick 2005).

19

Because of changes in our security state resulting from increased terrorist
activity, it is absolutely imperative that the transportation planning process more
thoroughly consider security implications when planning, screening, and
selecting projects. The National Research Council (1999) identified scenarios
(Table 2-1) that would be considered in the United States Department of
Transportation Vulnerability Assessment.

Even though these possibilities have been published since 1999, little has
been done to accommodate these concerns into the transportation planning
process. These issues have found refuge in the operations, maintenance, and
emergency response arenas. It is necessary to bring these issues forward into
the early planning processes in order to better control the possibilities.

20

Table 2-1
Vulnerability Assessment Scenarios
1. Car bomb at bridge approach
2. Series of small explosives on highway bridge
3. Single small explosive on highway bridge
4. Single small explosive in highway tunnel
5. Car bomb in highway tunnel
6. Series of car bombs on adjacent bridges or tunnels
7. Bomb detonated at pipeline compressor stations
8. Bomb detonated at pipeline storage facility
9. Bomb detonated on pipeline segment
10. Simultaneous attacks on ports
11. Bombing of waterfront pavilion
12. Container vessel fire at marine terminal
13. Ramming of railroad bridge by maritime vessel
14. Attack on passenger vessel in port
15. Shooting in rail station
16. Vehicle bomb adjacent to rail station
17. Bombing of airport transit station
18. Bombing of underwater transit tunnel
19. Bus bombing
20. Deliberate blocking of highway rail grade crossing
21. Bombing of rail tunnel
22. Bomb detonated on train in rail station
23. Vandalism of track structure and signal system
24. Bombing of rail bridge
25. Explosives attack on multiple rail bridges
26. Explosive in cargo of passenger aircraft
27. Biological release in multiple subway stations
28. Anthrax release from freight ship
29. Anthrax release in transit station
30. Anthrax release on passenger train
31. Sarin release in multiple subway stations
32. Physical attack on railcar carrying toxics
33. Cyber attack on highway traffic control system
34. Cyber attack on pipeline control system
35. Attack on port power/telecommunications
36. Sabotage of train control system
37. Tampering with rail signals
38. Cyber attack on train control center
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A literature review on this subject has to-date revealed very little directly
concerning the subject matter. Literature reviewed to date is broken into the
following security considerations that will be focal issues during the study.


General Planning Needs



Modal Integration



Mode Attractiveness



System Redundancy



Application Of Technology



Cost And Funding Priorities



System Performance



System Interdependency



Land Use Interaction



Risk Assessment



Public Participation



Information Availability



Planning Levels: Federal, State, Local



Organizational Structure



Legal Considerations



Facility Design
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2.2

General Planning Needs

Transportation processes have become increasingly complex over the
past decade, as issues related to security have increased in importance on a
widespread basis across the United States. It is very difficult to develop new
strategies for security improvements when the appropriate financial resources
are unavailable, or if there are political or leadership challenges involved in these
processes. It is increasingly difficult to develop processes that incorporate the
appropriate level of security measures, especially since there are governmental
bodies and leaders that are unable to secure the proper level of support and
financial resources to perform such tasks as effectively as required. Therefore,
there are considerable challenges that are evident in modern transportation
systems, as the ability to advance security is not always readily available without
modifying these systems dramatically in scope and premise.

It has been recognized by several individuals that there is a need for
considering security in the transportation planning process.

Khattak (2002)

concurred that there was no substantial literature on transportation security
planning prior to the September 11th attacks. Dillingham (2003) recently dealt
with the issue of long term challenges to transportation security. He identifies
five major challenges. These are:
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1. developing a comprehensive transportation risk management approach;
2. ensuring that transportation security funding needs are identified and
prioritized and that costs are controlled;
3. establishing effective coordination among the many public and private
entities responsible for transportation security;
4. ensuring adequate workforce competence and staffing levels; and
5. Implementing security standards for transportation facilities, workers, and
security equipment.

A comprehensive planning effort is necessary for each of these five
challenges to be met.

Flynn (2000) iterates that there is a need for “An ambitious,
comprehensive approach” to raise awareness, advance standards, promote
partnerships, and get adequate resources. Flynn also believes that
transportation security cannot be treated as a “secondary or even tertiary issue.”

Khattak (2002) reiterates the idea that the September 11 events have
increased the importance of national security. Most of the events and incidents
shared success because they were largely unexpected. They exposed “gaps” in
security planning. The gaps included lack of identification of critical assets and
security concerns in the transportation system, planning and preparation by
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governments, and erroneous perceptions of security risk by the general
population.

Dornan and Maier’s white paper (2005) serves as a strong example of a
key strategic process involved in planning for transportation security needs on a
long-term basis. The authors indicate that in developing any type of wide-range
transportation planning strategy, the following elements must be considered as
critical factors in these processes:


Provide support for economic development and stability in larger metropolitan
areas, where there is the greatest opportunity to engage in globalization
efforts and to promote competition;



In planning for any type of transportation, there must be a long-term safety
and security process in place to ensure that all users are protected as best as
possible;



Facilitate new and innovative options for transportation users so that their
needs are met, particularly if they are unable to utilize traditional methods;



All transportation planning efforts must encourage protecting the environment
from harm while allowing individuals to experience an enhanced quality of life
whenever possible;



Enable transportation routes to be efficient at all times, facilitating a greater
level of communication and ease in travel for all users;
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Facilitate the effective management and cohesiveness of all transportation
system operations; and to



Allow existing forms of transportation to maintain their effectiveness and to
encourage their efficiency under any and all circumstances

These criteria serve as critical markers in the maintenance of current
transportation processes, and they also provide a glimpse into the possibilities
that are available to facilitate effective security measures into these processes,
without interrupting the flow and progress of these systems as they are currently
maintained.

2.3

Modal Integration

In determining the best possible course of action regarding security for a
given transportation system, it is necessary to identify and understand the level
of progress that has already been made. There are a number of key issues to
consider in developing transportation strategies that incorporate mode specific
security needs into their processes, and a white paper created by Dornan and
Maier (2005) addresses such issues in a comprehensive and detailed format.
This paper begins with an introduction to the issues that have emerged since the
September 11th terrorist attacks, which have created new challenges for
transportation experts with regards to systemwide planning and strategic
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development on a long-term basis, including issues facing general operations
and the sustainability of such systems over time (Dornan and Maier 2005). It is
advantageous for field experts to begin to manage these challenges with an allinclusive examination of current modal processes, many of which may appear
outdated and ill-equipped to accommodate emerging security needs; however,
there is a marked lack of understanding between what is perceived as critical and
how to promote such issues in modern systems (Dornan and Maier 2005). With
this in mind, it is not surprising that transportation planners continue to struggle in
their efforts to identify the specific problems of each system and to develop
strategies to overcome these problems without lengthy or severe interruptions to
current processes, which might cause even further delays in maintaining
adequate systems on a long-term basis (Dornan and Maier 2005). Nonetheless,
these challenges must be faced directly and without fear, as transportation
continues to evolve and to require the expertise and support of a wide body of
groups in order to thrive, since individuals depend upon transportation in order to
conduct their lives normally and without serious disturbance to their routines.

Polzin (2002) indicates that inter-system connectivity could be impeded by
security concerns.

The transportation industry has encouraged intermodal

connectivity. Florida, along with other states, has been considering a high-speed
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rail for several years. These initiatives will most likely be affected and impaired
by the incorporation of security concerns into the planning process.

Khattak (2002) discusses the need for a comprehensive approach, with
security in mind.

This comprehensive approach must include different

transportation modes.

2.4

Mode Attractiveness

Modal attractiveness, both existing and influenced, is an important factor
for transportation planners.

Being able to determine the modal split is a

fundamental consideration in the transportation and traffic modeling systems. It
seems logical that if a planning study does not consider transportation alternative
to be viable due to concerns associated with the security of that mode then the
attractiveness of that mode would be artificially altered as a result of that finding.
This would most likely be a short term effect due to the resilience of modal
patrons and the dependency of those users on the systems. However, it could
prove annoying and difficult to properly analyze revenue potential of a particular
mode and to deal with other long-term planning issues such as infrastructure
needs. There should be sensitivity to the effects of identifying modes, routes or
infrastructure that are more vulnerable to security issues.

Polzin (2002)

discusses the issue of modal attractiveness in light of September 11th.
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He

discusses the impacts that September 11th had on the airline industry and the
subsequent shift in mode choice. He also discusses the possible discrepancies
that could occur as a result of mode based security funding differentials. These
differentials, or publicly perceived differentials, could greatly influence modal
attractiveness.

2.5

System Redundancy

It is most important to recognize that in promoting new security measures
for implementation in modern transportation systems, any number of possible
scenarios or opportunities for security mishaps can occur, such as with natural
disasters or with threats of terrorism. Transportation planning processes have
long been ill-equipped to handle these types of threats, which have exposed
serious defects in how these systems account for emergencies, regardless of
their source (Dornan and Maier 2005). These flaws could potentially lead to fatal
errors if they occur, and therefore, it is critical that transportation planning
strategists are well-prepared to manage these challenges on a widespread and
long-term basis (Dornan and Maier 2005).

System redundancy can provide alternative transportation modes and
routes when available. A traditional utility of redundancy is that of alternatives
associated with primary system failure as a result of events, such as crashes, or
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lack of capacity. The value of redundancy is clear when observed from the
user’s perspective. However, the value becomes less apparent or is mitigated
when dealing with funding these redundant systems. Honea (2000) ventured into
the topic of the planning of excess capacity. Excess capacity was recognized as
a necessity for the national defense. Certain types of industries, like the rail
industry, struggle to redeploy or add capacity due to the fixed nature of their
infrastructure. This occurs even in the presence of reliable demand forecasts
that justify the need for additional capacity. Other modes, like containers, deal
with a trade imbalance of high import, low export of containers. Therefore, ships
are already making trips with empty containers. For example, in the port of New
York, there is not enough staging area.

Excess capacity for redundancy or

capacity considerations is extremely difficult and costly. New York is not alone in
this dilemma. Every port in the eastern United States faces this problem as the
public demands greater access to water fronts. Morgan (2000) believes that the
existing surface transportation system has a tremendous amount of redundancy
built in as evidenced by the system’s rapid recovery after natural disasters.

2.6

Application Of Technology

Technology presents many tools to be used in the transportation operation
and maintenance processes. Some of these tools may have limited utility when
planning for security. For example, the use of Intelligent Transportation Systems
30

(ITS) and databases for drivers license processing hold great potential for
preventing security events through detection of potential terrorists before they
have the opportunity to strike.

However, the value of those technologies is

unclear when dealing with planning of infrastructure.

The installation and

operation of these technologies requires coordination and the utility in the
planning phase needs to be completely explored.

In the modern world, technology infiltrates almost each and every aspect
of existence in one way or another. In transportation planning, technology is
utilized in many different areas, as there are specific needs that are best
accommodated through technological means. Therefore, it is not surprising that
transportation systems have evolved in recent years utilizing a combination of
computer-based and other technology-based solutions in order to satisfy all
desired objectives.

A study conducted by Siwek and Associates (1999)

examines the implementation of ITS as a means of promoting change and
progress within these systems in order to provide a greater level of service for
users. In order to satisfy the ever-changing needs of technology-based solutions
in modern transportation systems, the Intermodal Surface Transportation
Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991 was established as a means of promoting
efficiency and advanced solutions to problems in transportation systems (Siwek
and Associates 1999).

ITS has evolved over time as a primary method of
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providing exemplary service to transportation users, and it offers a greater level
of understanding of the challenges of modern transportation systems, including
but not limited to emergency response (Siwek and Associates 1999). However,
the integration of various technologies into transportation systems has always
been a challenge for leaders and experts in the field, as existing frameworks
have often been unequipped to manage these challenges without serious
interruptions to service (Siwek and Associates 1999). Nonetheless, there are
considerable advantages to the implementation of these technologies, as they
provide a greater level of efficiency, increased response times, and financial
savings over the long term (Siwek and Associates 1999). It is expected that with
continuous improvement on strategies incorporating emerging technologies,
these systems, in theory, will be prepared for security events, such as terrorist
threats or attacks (Siwek and Associates 1999). In determining the best possible
course of action for a given transportation system, it is necessary to conduct the
following evaluation: “As part of plan development, State or regional goals,
objectives and performance measures can be identified to take into account how
transportation facilities and services address, now and in the future, the social,
environmental and economic goals of the State or region” (Siwek and Associates
1999). It is not surprising that these objectives represent tremendous challenges
for many transportation systems, as their existing frameworks may not be
prepared to identify or to manage such goals. However, they must be ultimately
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incorporated into existing systems as a means of promoting change, progress,
and to enhance existing security measures to satisfy users (Siwek and
Associates 1999). In general, ITS serves two primary purposes, that of providing
information to users so that these systems work more efficiently for their needs,
and to provide improvements to general operations that will ensure long-term
efficiencies at the operations level (Siwek and Associates 1999). Since there are
a number of options available in the ITS portfolio, decisions regarding these
systems must be made with considerations of current processes, the end users,
and the entire well being of the system in question (Siwek and Associates 1999).

Although ITS serves as a helpful strategy in promoting progress
throughout a given transportation system, it is necessary to consider these
alternatives as only one component of a larger and more widespread set of
strategies for implementation (Siwek and Associates 1999). In other words, ITS
could potentially serve as the backbone or driving force of any given system, but
it should not be the sole solution, as it is not capable of accommodating all
possible system needs (Siwek and Associates 1999).

Therefore, continuous

improvement strategies must ultimately be considered as one of the key
indicators of advanced progress in transportation systems (Siwek and Associates
1999). Other challenges remain that must also be evaluated and modified when
necessary, and these include the following:
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Developing a greater understanding of ITS and its role with the cooperation of
a variety of public and private agencies involved in transportation planning;



Developing the technical capacity that is necessary to accommodate ITS
initiatives of all types;



Developing the capabilities that are necessary to implement and support ITS
on a widespread basis;



Evaluating all financial opportunities and limitations, many of which may
require the support of members of private agencies (Siwek and Associates
1999).

It is not surprising that many transportation systems require extensive
modifications to their existing processes in order to adapt to ITS, but these
objectives may be realized with a concentrated effort from all involved parties
(Siwek and Associates 1999).

It is important to identify locations that have successfully implemented ITS
strategies into their existing transportation systems. For example, Chicago, IL
possesses a complex network of associations amongst various agencies and
other groups that are involved in transportation planning and implementation, and
these groups have been successful in effectively communicating with each other
through an established committee known as the Metropolitan Area Mayors’
Caucus (Volpe Center 2000). By utilizing this committee to communicate ideas,
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express concerns, and share challenges, Chicago has been able to satisfy a
number of objectives with respect to transportation systems, and this serves as a
strong example of change and the ability to work cohesively towards a common
goal (Volpe Center 2000).

It is important in developing any transportation

planning strategy involving ITS to perform the following:


Include stakeholders from local and regional groups in order to secure the
support of these key players in ITS strategies;



Provide knowledge and information to local officials with respect to ITS so
that the decision-making process is effectively promoted and implemented;



Initiate project development strategies for future use, all of which depend
upon ITS information that is readily available for use;



Provide information to the general public regarding ITS, so that all objectives
are appropriately communicated to the end users;



Engage in networking strategies that will facilitate shared knowledge and
resources; and



Develop the appropriate strategies with respect to collecting data for use in
ITS implementation (Volpe Center 2000).

These

objectives

serve

as

important

indicators

of

the

overall

receptiveness of ITS planners, stakeholders, and general public involvement in
any projects that may occur (Volpe Center 2000). With these strategies in place,
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ITS initiatives are likely to be well received by key stakeholders and the general
public at large.

Another key example of the success of an ITS initiative is Miami, FL,
whereby an active committee was formed in order to identify the capabilities and
advantages of ITS systems within existing transportation frameworks, and the
committee included members of many different organizations, as a means of
understanding how these changes could shape the direction of transportation
planning in future years (Volpe Center 2000). With the committee firmly in place,
a variety of ITS initiatives have been considered across the State of Florida, with
specific concentrations in fiber optic connectivity and other related technologies
(Volpe Center 2000). These opportunities have provided some insights into the
current gaps in technology and strategy that have been observed, due in part to
a prior lack of knowledge and resources for implementation (Volpe Center 2000).
However, with respect to these challenges, the committee has created new
strategies for consideration and possible implementation in future years (Volpe
Center 2000).

Other considerations for transportation planning involving ITS must
include the widespread dissemination of knowledge and information regarding
these processes to elected leaders and other officials (Volpe Center 2000).
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According to the text, after this educational endeavor had taken place in the
Dallas-Fort Worth area,

“Including both elected officials and technical staff enhanced these
discussions and improved communications between the two groups
in terms of their expectations from ITS products and services.
Operations staff gained a better understanding of the nontechnical
concerns of the elected officials, and elected officials better
understood the level of effort and timelines associated with
deploying ITS projects” (Volpe Center 2000)

These initiatives are particularly important in facilitating the change that is
necessary in providing the best possible measures for security and related
support across all transportation systems, as they offer the appropriate personnel
the knowledge and information that is required to make educated and well
informed decisions that are likely to influence transportation systems in positive
ways (Volpe Center 2000). Furthermore, it should be noted that transportation
planning without the implementation of ITS initiatives will not be successful in
providing effective options for end users, who serve as the most critical receivers
of these systems (Volpe Center 2000). With this in mind, it is critical to continue
the education and advancement of ITS initiatives for leaders, officials, experts,
and even the end users (Volpe Center 2000).
37

2.7

Cost And Funding Priorities

Costs associated with security planning can consist of both direct and
indirect costs. Direct costs can include design, construction, maintenance, and
operation of improvements for both retrofit and new projects. Indirect costs can
include right-of-way value impacts, cost of additional labor, tourism impacts,
investment attractiveness, and delays associated with changing priorities. It is
common in current practices to consider these costs when making transportation
decisions. These considerations usually take the form of Benefit/Cost analyses.
The current practices do not assign quantifiable benefits to a particular security
consideration.

Therefore, it is not possible to adequately incorporate those

considerations into the analyses.

Transportation planning strategies serve as a substantial portion of the
United States gross economic product, with approximately $1 trillion in spending
on an annual basis (Dornan and Maier 2005). This figure is highly significant, as
it represents a relatively large portion of federal spending for programs, and since
transportation infiltrates almost every aspect of daily living, this funding must be
expended wisely and without waste in order to preserve the integrity of these
processes (Dornan and Maier 2005). With the increased interest in promoting
security within these processes, it is not surprising that continuous assessments
of transportation planning must take place in order to utilize such allocations as
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best as possible so that residents are protected and supported by their own tax
dollars (Dornan and Maier 2005). However, transportation planning has long
been weak in many of these areas, as there have been considerable flaws in
how security measures are provided to the public, their flexibility, and their overall
long-term sustainability, considering the financial resources that are available for
use (Dornan and Maier 2005).

There is considerable evidence to suggest that transportation planning
strategies require a complex evaluation of current processes and routine needs
assessments in order to promote change and progress regarding security
measures.

For example, some of the key required steps include financial

forecasting of projected costs regarding operations and new program
implementation; the utilization of existing land versus new land requirements; the
feasibility of growth opportunities in existing regions in order to accommodate
new users; the ability to utilize new and existing capital resources to maximize
transportation opportunities; and identify areas of weakness and the potential for
widespread improvements that will best influence transportation system users
without serious interruptions to daily activities (Dornan and Maier 2005).

The development of modified transportation planning processes requires
extensive funding from a wide variety of sponsors, including federal, state and
local agencies. Federal funding is especially critical in developing new security
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strategies for transportation, and there is a general rule that as spending is
incurred upon approval of a given project, costs will be reimbursed by the federal
government for the work that is performed in a given location (The Metropolitan
Transportation Planning Process 2004). Each year, Congress is responsible for
allocating a specific amount of funding for specific projects deemed necessary for
the general operations of the U.S. Department of Transportation, with specific
spending guidelines for many programs (The Metropolitan Transportation
Planning Process 2004). Much of this funding is required to maintain existing
operations within a given location; however, some project-specific funding is
usually available for facilitating new programs that may include measures for
security and other related issues (The Metropolitan Transportation Planning
Process 2004).

It is expected that as these needs arise, funding will be

requested by states and local governments for specific projects, and that
transportation experts, upon notification of funding, will implement their chosen
strategies in order to promote greater effectiveness in the transportation planning
process (The Metropolitan Transportation Planning Process 2004).

There are many different aspects of the transportation planning process
that require specific attention to security details as well as measures for longterm improvements.

With the specific allocations by the federal government

provided on an annual basis, it is not surprising that an ever-increasing amount
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of funding is being allocated for security-specific projects; nonetheless, there are
many weaknesses in these plans, due in large part to funding constraints at all
levels. Simply put, the amount of funding allocated for security strategies is still
relatively low, which challenges transportation planners to develop additional
cost-effective measures for supporting security needs in metropolitan areas and
beyond.

Funding for transportation projects can be controlled, in both amount and
allocation, by many factors. Unfortunately, security is not one of them. Safety is
a very prominent factor in that it can generate funds in a very short time frame.
For instance, in Florida, if a hurricane causes a high degree of scour on a major
bridge that requires replacement of that structure, that project will receive priority
funding due the importance of that linkage to the regional interests and the safety
concerns associated with leaving the existing bridge. However, the new bridge
may not receive additional funds to enhance its security attributes. Changes to
existing systems will not go unchallenged because the addition of a single factor
will cause competition for limited funds with other projects.

Dillingham (2003) addresses funding and risk management issues. The
most critical funding criteria are identified as ridership level, population, identified
vulnerabilities, and criticality of assets. Funds should also use risk-based criteria
for fund distribution. Two key funding and accountability challenges will be (1)
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paying for increased transportation security and (2) ensuring that these costs are
controlled. The funding estimates for security projects do not come close to
matching the project demand. In August 2002, the Congress appropriated $93
million to fund security improvements at the nation’s 361 ports in fiscal year
2002, but the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) received applications
for as much as $697 million for these improvements. This is a differential of $604
million between what is provided and what is needed.

Polzin (2002) summarized the resource pressures resulting from security
concerns as:


Diversion of resources to security needs outside of transportation programs



Diversion of funds to operating security enforcement, policing, planning,
training



Diversion of funds to capital investments in security (i.e. barriers, fencing,
inspection)



Use of funds to support network redundancy/connectivity



Use of funds to support modal choice/redundancy

The President’s Fiscal Year 2005 Budget calls for significant increases in
the security budget. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has a proposed

42

doubling of funding for counterterrorism and counterintelligence. This equates to
44% of their total budget (Table 2-2). (2004)

Table 2-2
FBI Funding For FY2005
Element
Construction
Forensic
Security
National Security
Criminal
Cyber Investigations
Technology Investments
TOTAL
2.8

Budget (US$)
$1,242,000
$166,615,000
$262,083,000
$2,241,114,000
$1,638,867,000
$283,041,000
$522,308,000
$5,115,270,000

Percentage (%)
0.02%
3.26%
5.12%
43.81%
32.04%
5.53%
10.21%
100.00%

System Performance

Polzin (2002) discusses the issue of system performance as the “most
obvious area of impact to transportation.” He proposes that security concerns
can impact the following performance measures:


Cost to user



Speed



Accessibility



Reliability



Safety/security

43



Convenience



Connectivity

The consideration of security in the planning process will mean a
redefining of traditional performance criteria and formulas.

2.9

System Interdependency

Currently, most systems are evaluated independently when dealing with
planning, design, funding, operation, and maintenance considerations. This is
partially driven by the condition that systems are funded through different means
that are directly related to the type of system. For example, federal roadway
resurfacing dollars are not normally used to fund a new bus station along a
roadway.
different

The current transportation planning process struggles to consider
modes

independently.

or

systems

collectively

or

it

simply

considers

them

This is not a desirable situation from a security planning

perspective or from an overall efficiency standpoint. The planning processes
should take into consideration the interdependency of these systems in
evaluating security issues and in resources allocations. Morgan (2000) stated
that the Department of Transportation should implement Research and
Development, for security, across transportation modes, not separately for each
mode.
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It is strongly suggested that all transportation planning processes must
account for enhanced security measures and objectives whenever possible.
However, these goals are very difficult to achieve and maintain without a specific
strategy, which involves a variety of public agencies and private groups, as well
as general public awareness of the possible threats to the security of these
systems. An article by Nelson (1999) examines these associations in greater
detail, noting that there are many challenges involved in building cohesive and
effective associations amongst these different groups, as they each possess their
own agendas and objectives, many of which may not be supportive of one
another. The article suggests that in preparing any transportation system for the
real threat of terrorist attacks, all organizations involved in the planning process
must develop what is known as a “dress rehearsal,” whereby all parties work
together in conjunction with each other in a mock disaster incident, so that each
team is aware of the responsibilities involved in achieving all desired objectives
(Nelson 1999). In any transit system, there must be a comprehensive evaluation
of entrance and exit points, where many users are likely to be found waiting for
their chosen mode of transportation to arrive and depart (Nelson 1999). These
locations are particularly vulnerable to potential acts of terrorism, since terrorists
are indeed aware of the increased numbers of users at these points, thereby
creating the potential for mass destruction in one concentrated area (Nelson
1999). Furthermore, fuel used for buses, electrical switches, train or rail tracks,
45

and computer systems must be continuously evaluated for any unexpected
changes or threats (Nelson 1999).

These steps are necessary in the

development of any routine transportation planning process, and officials must
not take these concerns for granted, since it is possible that terrorists may
identify these vulnerabilities and take dangerous action if it is known that there
are weaknesses in a given system (Nelson 1999). The author also notes that
there must be comprehensive and detailed evaluation strategies in place at all
times, since passengers must be protected from additional harm whenever
possible (Nelson 1999). The author states that “Evacuation plans should include
the selection of staging areas, where passengers can await transport to safe
locations…if possible; alternatives to the affected transit line or system must be
established in order to diminish the crowds that would otherwise accumulate at
the scene” (Nelson 1999). Therefore, it is strongly suggested that emergency
response plans must incorporate these types of objectives into the mix, since
there is a strong likelihood of serious damage and casualties if these plans are
not considered prior to an attack (Nelson 1999).

If at all possible, the

development of emergency response plans that include the evaluation of
possible tampering of systems and vulnerable areas is particularly advantageous
in developing an effective security planning process (Nelson 1999). Much of the
lack of preparedness for terrorist threats to transportation systems has been in
faulty designs and the lack of knowledge regarding threats when these systems
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were created; therefore, it is often required that systems must undergo
modifications in order to update equipment, exit and entrance locations, and
computer systems in order to better recognize threats that may occur, as well as
to better prepare users for the possibilities that might exist, allowing them to
increase their awareness of such events (Nelson 1999).

It is also expected that as transportation planning initiatives continue to
emerge throughout the United States, there must be considerable measures in
place that will accommodate the many users of public transit systems, including
buses, railways, and subways. However, prior to the development of any revised
guidelines for emergency preparedness in transportation systems, the following
assessments must be conducted and evaluated:

1. A general risk assessment must be performed in order to evaluate the
potential threats against a system in a given location;
2. The likelihood of serious hazards stemming from acts of terrorism must
also be considered; and
3. There must be a comprehensive strategy in place to manage any
perceived risks or hazards that might occur as a result of a terrorist attack
or threat (Boyd and Sullivan 2000).
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There is a critical need in transportation planning processes to evaluate
and consider the long-term outcomes of terrorist acts or threats, since these may
incite fear in passengers, leading to a reduction in use of such systems over
time. Therefore, if passengers are assured that their time spent in the transit
system is as secure as possible; there is a greater likelihood that these
circumstances

will

be

managed

more

effectively

and

without

serious

consequences. Nonetheless, passengers must also be assured that their time
spent on the public transit system will be secure, and this requires an extensive
effort from all responsible agencies to ensure passengers that all measures are
being taken to facilitate smooth travel time.

2.10 Land Use Interaction

There are many issues surrounding a discussion of land use interaction
with security planning.

Many questions arise about what effect security

considerations have upon this such as zoning and access management. The
current planning processes consider land use when establishing system routes
and alignments. When perceived through a security planning framework, that
process of alternatives evaluation will need to be modified.

Polzin (2002)

recently discussed this issue. He identified implications ranging from an increase
in employment dispersion and sprawl to a refocus on the function and importance
of the city. If additional security events occur in highly populated areas, some
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shifts in migration patterns may occur as a result.

This may become more

important as Florida is beginning to look at transportation corridor preservation.
If security becomes one of the main criteria in evaluating and establishing these
corridors, land use will be affected.

2.11 Risk Assessment

The strategic development of transportation planning processes that
involve security require that there must be substantial knowledge of the risks
involved with maintaining these elements, as they are often very difficult to
achieve without adequate financial resources.

Much of the interest in

transportation security planning processes has emerged in large part due to postterrorism fears after September 11th, and there is a marked interest in
emergency response efforts throughout all types of transportation planning
mechanisms (Dornan and Maier 2005).

However, throughout the evaluation

process, highly visible flaws in security have been exposed to the general public
and to experts in the field, which have created considerable challenges in their
efforts to overcome these gaps in knowledge and information (Dornan and Maier
2005).

In metropolitan areas, where these processes are highly visible and

prominent, it is especially critical to develop and implement security strategies
that will accommodate the specific needs and calm the fears of residents that
utilize various forms of transportation, including but not limited to the subway and
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bus lines (Dornan and Maier 2005).

However, it is just as important to

understand that security efforts are limited by the ability to secure funding for
such projects at the local, state and federal levels, and that if these resources are
scarce or are lacking altogether, little if any progress is anticipated in ensuring
that transportation users feel more secure in their travels (Dornan and Maier
2005).

It is important to recognize the varying degrees of risk that are involved in
threats to transportation systems, and this often requires an extensive
examination of risk levels, as noted in Table 2-3 (Boyd and Sullivan 2000). Upon
review and evaluation of the appropriate levels of risk involved in a given transit
system, it is critical that the corresponding emergency preparedness strategy is
also established in order to provide the best possible short- and long-term
outcomes (Boyd and Sullivan 2000). According to the authors,

“In general, emergency plans used in the transit environment
provide guidance for reporting and evaluating the incident, using
the incident command system, notifying emergency response
personnel/agencies, protecting personnel and equipment at the
incident site, dispatching emergency response personnel and
equipment to the site, evacuating passengers, providing briefings
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and information updates, managing the emergency, and restoring
the system to normal” (Boyd and Sullivan 2000)

Table 2-3
Transit Risk Levels
Risk Level
1

2

3
4
5

Definition
Facilities whose loss or damage would have a major
financial impact or result in the extended interruption of
critical services.
Facilities containing items of physical value, confidential
information,
or
computer
access
to
sensitive
data/operational processing networks.
Facilities whose disruption would be moderately serious.
Facilities relatively unimportant to operations
Criticality cannot be assessed

Risk considerations are often mitigated through improving design
practices.

This is somewhat of a self-policing process which involves

modifications to current practices once a risk threshold has been crossed. In the
planning process, risk must be estimated for at least two reasons:

(1) to

determine what additional costs may be associated with a project due to
increased risk that requires additional considerations, or (2) to determine if a
potential project is considered feasible due to properly considering security risks.
It may be necessary and beneficial to adapt and transfer current practices in
other industries to the transportation planning arena.

This would most likely

greatly reduce the “learning curve” and allow more rapid application of these
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assessment methods to transportation planning by taking advantage of the
lessons learned in other areas.

2.12 Public Participation

One of the major initiatives over the past 10 years has been to provide
and encourage the public to be more involved in the transportation planning
process.

These initiatives have occurred nationwide.

These practices will

present a problem when security considerations are factored into the planning
and decision-making processes.

These processes will lose some of their

transparency and the public may feel cheated out of their right to know when in
fact the information may simply be classified. It is most probably not reasonable
to expect the public to accept a decision without knowing all of the factors that
went into that decision. Guidelines should be developed to assist those agencies
presenting alternatives to the public with explanations without security
compromises.

Depending upon the metropolitan location under consideration, there
might be varying degrees of interest in security, as the need to develop strategies
for natural disasters may be more important than the needs involving threats of
terrorism, with examples including hurricanes and earthquakes (Dornan and
Maier 2005). Since the proposed study is primarily concerned with transportation
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security planning processes for the State of Florida, it is not surprising that the
marked threat of hurricanes during peak season is considered to be an
overwhelming challenge to most residents.

In 2005, one of the most active

hurricane seasons in history emerged and led to considerable threats to the
livelihood of many residents of Florida, and therefore, it should be noted that
many challenges involving transportation, security and the overall well being of
residents were identified and compromised as a direct result these disasters.
Therefore, the emergency preparedness of Floridians for such events continues
to be of great concern for all residents. However, this is not the only issue that is
cause for alarm, as threats of terrorism, although not clearly obvious in Florida,
nonetheless continue to create apprehension for residents throughout the state.
Florida residents want to know what plans are in place to protect them from both
natural and man-made disasters.

2.13 Information Availability

In Florida many transportation planning studies involve data that is
considered the “best available.”

This limit is imposed by both the cost of

collecting additional data or the time constraints associated with the project.
Transportation planners need some guidance on how to properly consider
transportation security when the information available is not the “best” or is
simply not “available” because of security concerns.
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It is important for

transportation planners to know what assumptions or “rules of thumb” are most
accurate, even without having all of the relevant data.

Although there has been much interest over the years in how to effectively
prepare for safety in transportation planning, security measures have long been
ignored, perhaps due in large part to a lack of knowledge and available
resources for such projects (Dornan and Maier 2005). However, it should be
duly noted that security and safety are not considered as the same, and that they
should be evaluated and managed with different strategies in mind, as noted in
the following: “Safety initiatives often have no bearing on the security of
transportation facilities or services, and security initiatives may not impact the
safety of transportation facilities or services” (Dornan and Maier 2005).
Therefore, this study was not used as a means of grouping these concepts
together, because their primary objectives and strategies should remain unique
and distinct from one another throughout all planning processes.

2.14 Planning Levels: Federal, State, Local

Current planning practices allow control of key transportation decisions at
different levels. Some decisions are made at the federal level whereas others
are made at the state or local level. For example, the Florida Department of
Transportation controls the flow of federal roadway and bridge dollars but the
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local Metropolitan Planning Organizations or County Commissions assign project
priorities. The local governments control which projects go to the top of the
priority list.

There should be a clear definition of who is responsible for

addressing security issues during transportation planning. There should also be
clarification of who else needs to evaluate those issues. For example, should a
federally-controlled project be subject to local government scrutiny or visa versa.

In 1997, a study was conducted by Jenkins as a means of identifying the
challenges of developing strategies in response to threats of terrorism across
transportation channels. There are a number of key considerations that must be
identified, implemented and evaluated with respect to terrorist threats, and there
must be effective measures in place in the transportation planning process in
response to these needs (Jenkins 1997). According to the author, “The general
framework of preparedness progresses from planning and mitigation measures
through response and recovery. The pre-incident mitigation steps incorporate, at
a minimum, security and detection devices, environmental design, training, and
outreach activities. The preparedness step focuses on the institutional capacity
and capability of both internal and external emergency-response organizations
and teams” (Jenkins 1997). This statement demonstrates that there must be a
concentrated effort from a team of individuals that are focused on the same
objectives in order to promote the best possible outcomes for transportation
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planning processes, and that if emergency incidents occur, there will be a
learning curve that is designed to encourage new types of response methods to
promote improved outcomes (Jenkins 1997).

It is important to recognize that terrorist threats have increased in scope
and incidence over the past quarter-century, and consequently, transportation
systems continue to require additional security measures to be prepared for such
events (Jenkins 1997). One of the key objectives of any terrorist threat or attack
is to incite fear in mass numbers of transportation users, and therefore, it is not
surprising that terrorists utilize these systems as a means of facilitating
widespread panic and uproar (Jenkins 1997). It should also be known that such
attacks are planned over a long period of time in order to maximize the potential
for the greatest possible level of damage and destruction, which signifies the
intelligence and research that is performed in deciding the location and extent of
terrorist attacks on existing transportation systems (Jenkins 1997). Table 2-4
provides a historical perspective regarding terrorist targets over the past few
decades, and it demonstrates that there is a widespread mix of attack targets
that terrorists utilize in order to satisfy their desired objectives to create fear,
panic and destruction within a given location (Jenkins 1997). It is not surprising
that bombings are the most common strategy that is used by terrorists,
responsible for approximately 61 percent of all attacks for the period under
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consideration (Jenkins 1997). According the author, public transportation serves
as a notable and relatively easy target, as noted in the following statement:

“These events clearly indicate that contemporary terrorists have
made public transportation a new theater of operations. For those
determined to kill in quantity and willing to kill indiscriminately,
public transportation offers an ideal target. It is public, used by
millions of people daily. There is necessarily little security with no
obvious chokepoints (like those at airports) to inspect passengers
and parcels. The passengers are strangers promising attackers
anonymity and easy escape. Concentrations of people in contained
environments are especially vulnerable to conventional explosives
and

unconventional

weapons.

Also,

attacks

on

public

transportation, the circulatory systems of urban environments,
cause great disruption and alarm which are the traditional goals of
terrorism” (Jenkins 1997).

This statement is not surprising, considering the importance of terrorism in
modern society as a primary means of generating fear and panic in a given group
of unsuspecting individuals; in other words, acts of terrorism via public
transportation allow terrorists to advance their cause and to spread the word in a
significant way (Jenkins 1997). Therefore, field experts and government officials
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must be effectively prepared to manage such attacks on their systems without
creating additional panic or harm whenever possible (Jenkins 1997).

Table 2-4
Location Of Attacks On Public Transportation Systems
Location
Buses
Subways and Trains
Subway and Train Stations
Rails
Bus Terminals
Tourist Buses
Bridges
Other
School Buses
Tunnels

Percentage (%)
29
27
13
8
7
7
6
2
1
0 (2 Incidents)

In developing an effective security strategy for transportation systems, it is
critical to reexamine current priorities and involved parties to determine if any
new stakeholders or key players must be considered in the planning process
(Dornan and Maier 2005).

For example, it is necessary to include local

emergency response teams, as well as national teams, such as FEMA and the
FBI in such processes, since these teams may possess additional knowledge
and skills that will facilitate a greater response to these challenges (Dornan and
Maier 2005). A greater level of oversight and guidance from national response
teams is absolutely critical in developing an effective response strategy, as these
teams are much more knowledgeable of the requirements and cost of enhanced
security measures in the desired location (Dornan and Maier 2005).
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Furthermore, these teams often provide manpower and other resources that are
not readily available at the local level due to limited financial resources or other
limiting constraints (Dornan and Maier 2005). Regardless of the type of system
under consideration, it is anticipated that extensive knowledge and resources
from federal agencies is required in order to develop effective long-range security
strategies (Dornan and Maier 2005).

2.15 Organizational Structure

Most governments seem to be using existing departments and staff to
handle security considerations by simply adding those responsibilities to the
primary duties of those staff. In most instances, the designated staffs are those
associated with law enforcement or emergency response. However, few to none
of these people have the training or experience to evaluate transportation
alternatives based on security considerations. Ideally, there should be people
who are uniquely qualified to deal with the planning implications of security and
these duties should be their primary responsibility.

It is very important to identify the key roles and responsibilities of all
federal, state and local agencies that are involved in developing effective
transportation security planning strategies. The following key objectives must be
satisfied in any unified transportation strategy:
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Developing a single response to any incidents that might occur so that all
resources are utilized wisely;



All goals are satisfied in a cohesive manner;



Information is gathered and shared so that all agencies are provided with the
data that is necessary to conduct an effective response;



All agencies are well aware of their limitations in these processes; and



All possible efforts that would lead to duplication are eliminated whenever
possible (Boyd and Sullivan 2000).

Although these objectives appear to be relatively simple, they are in fact
very difficult to accomplish if all supporting agencies do not take their
responsibilities seriously and without consideration of the roles of other teams in
these processes, since these actions could be detrimental to the overall integrity
of the chosen strategy and the potential outcomes for managing the disaster
without dire or long-term consequences (Boyd and Sullivan 2000).

2.16 Legal Considerations

There are many legal issues involved in transportation planning with
regards to security issues. A security event usually results in a loss of property
or life. Those affected will seek resolution concerning the level of preventative
efforts taken. Current practices do very little to address these liability concerns.
60

Actual cases will go a long way in determining the parameters concerning
adequate levels of consideration.

However, there are secondary issues that

must be addressed, including the inadvertent identification of critical assets
through consideration during the transportation planning processes.

Recent legislation, Senate Bill 1138, in the State of Florida has allowed
Construction Engineering & Inspection Consultants (CEI) to be considered
agents of the state. This was done to protect CEI companies from lawsuits that
put an undue strain on the cost of doing business in Florida. Contractors are
already protected as agents of the state.
pockets.

However, people will seek deep

In should be expected that lawyers representing citizens who are

seeking compensation for an injury would essentially work their way upstream in
the process. Figure 2-1 shows the typical project process consists of planning,
design, asset acquisition, construction, and Operations & Maintenance.

The

process starts at time equal zero with the Planning Phase and progresses along
the timeline as shown. If construction contractors and management companies
are agents of the state then the next phase upstream would involve the project
designers. Next to these people are the planners.
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Figure 2-1
Typical Project Process

Level
Of Effort

Planning

0

Design

2

4
Time (Years)
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Asset
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6

Inf

8

Guidelines should be developed that contain recommendations on how and
when to protect planners who are making decisions that consider security,
especially when those projects involve design, right-of-way acquisition, or
construction that may be contrary to the traditional processes.

2.17 Facility Design

The focus of this study did not involve reinventing the ways in which
transportation design is done. Transportation design, whether it be roadways or
railways is an established science with proven methodologies.

The study

focused on sensitizing designers to potential safety and security issues that
result from challenges to security.

This exposure may generate different

combinations or permutations of design elements in response to these
challenges. It may also involve the usage of additional design elements whose
sole use is to protect the users of the facility or adjacent interests.
additional elements will impact the project’s budget.
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These

Chapter 3
Framework For Security Planning

In order to better understand the project development process in Florida, it
is important to understand the legislative background that mandates the process
and the major stakeholders that have a role in transportation security.
Historically, aspects of the transportation planning process were addressed
separately in different legislation and regulations (Figure 3-1) and have
traditionally only addressed safety.

More importantly, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the
current and past two highway acts have done the most to shape the current state
of project development.

They are particularly important because the PD&E

process is the manifestation of NEPA in Florida. Other key legislation includes
the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA),
Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), and Safe, Accountable,
Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU).
A more detailed discussion of these key pieces of legislation is included in
Appendix E.
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Figure 3-1
Safety Legislation/Regulations
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1934
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1944
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962
Highway and Motor Vehicle Safety Acts of 1966
Department of Transportation Act of 1966
The National Highway Safety Act of 1966
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968
Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973
Highway Safety Act of 1973
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1976
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1981
The Highway Safety Improvement Program (HSIP) (1982)
23 United States Code 134 - Metropolitan Planning
23 United Stated Code 135 - Statewide Planning
There are a large number of agencies involved in the transportation
planning process. Each of these organizations has their own versions of plans
and goals related to their transportation networks. All of these organizations are
moving towards improving the overall efficiency and security of their networks.
However the different methodologies and organizational structures can be
counterproductive to the overall emphasis on transportation security planning. A
detailed description of roles, responsibilities, and objectives are included in
Appendix F. The key players are shown in Figure 3-2.
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Figure 3-2
Key Transportation Planning Agencies
Transportation Planning Agencies

United States Department of
Transportation (USDOT)

Transportation Research
Board (TRB)

Department of Homeland
Security (DHS)

•Office of the Secretary (OST)
•Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
•Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)
•Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA)
•Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)
•Federal Transit Administration (FTA)
•Maritime Administration (MARAD)
•National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
•Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)
•Research and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA)
•Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation (SLSDC)
•Surface Transportation Board (STB)
•Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
•Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
•Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ)

National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB)

Private Organizations

3.1

•American Public Transportation Associations (APTA)
•American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO)
•Institute of Transportation Engineers (ITE)

Florida’s Existing Project Development Processes

Florida approved Procedure Number 650-000-001 on November 21, 1991
which established the use of the Project Development & Environment (PD&E)
Manual to be used for the project development process. The PD&E Manual must
be used any time the FDOT is involved, in any way, with the preparation of an
environmental document in compliance with the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) of 1969. The authority to use the PD&E Manual as the basis of
process comes from an informal agreement between the FDOT and the Federal
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Highway

Administration

(FHWA)

(2003).

The

Central

Environmental

Management Office has responsibility for development of the manual and
subsequent updates. The procedures as documented in this manual serve to
meet the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and
other federal and state laws.

The PD&E manual requires a multi-disciplined

approach to project development.

The Florida Department of Transportation

works closely with the local governments and the Metropolitan Planning
Organization (MPO) as they develop their Long Range Transportation Plan
(LRTP). The LRTP determines the transportation improvements required over
the next 20 to 25 years. The MPO's also develop a Transportation Improvement
Program (TIP) which identifies and prioritizes transportation projects to be
implemented within a 10 year period based on the LRTP. Once the priorities are
identified in the TIP, they are programmed in the FDOT's 5 Year Work Program.
Once a project is programmed, the Project Development & Environment (PD&E)
Study phase can begin.

The PD&E Study phase for planned transportation projects provides the
interface between the Planning and Design phases to evaluate and document
solutions to transportation needs that are compatible with the environment. The
PD&E study determines if there is an engineering and environmentally feasible
alternative to meet the need determined in the Planning phase. This process is
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mandated by the NEPA and State law. It represents a combined effort by
technical professionals who analyze information and document the best
alternative to meet transportation needs.

The PD&E process is well documented in the PD&E Manual (FDOT
1997). In order to understand how and where security considerations should be
integrated, it is necessary to explain this process in some detail, especially those
steps or phases where changes are recommended. Processes addressed in this
chapter will only focus on those elements of the process that require
transportation security considerations.

The steps in the process can be grouped into the Initialization, Data
Collection, Analysis, Finalization, and Informational Phases (Figure 3-3).

It is

also important to note that, during all of the Phases, Public Involvement activities
occur and are extremely important to educate and inform the public of programs,
projects, and strategies.
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Figure 3-3
Florida’s Existing Project Development Process
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3.1.1 Existing Initialization Phase

The Initialization Phase includes the recognition of a transportation need
and adherence to the Advance Notification (AN) Process.

The first step is to

determine project need which requires proof that a proposed alternative is
consistent with local planning efforts.

The PD&E Manual, Part 2, Chapter 5

requires that all proposed projects be consistent with local transportation and
comprehensive planning, land use planning and growth management efforts.
The local planning efforts must be updated to reflect the necessary short-term
and long-term security needs for their regions. Otherwise, proposed alternatives
involving security considerations cannot be consistent with local planning efforts.

The AN Process is the process in which Federal, State, Local agencies
and other stakeholders are informed of a proposed project by the FDOT. It
serves to notify those same agencies that the FDOT intends to seek federal
funding for the project. It, due to geographic location, will trigger other federal or
state processes such as the Florida Coastal Zone Management Program
(FCMP). The AN process is required by the Presidential Executive Order 12372
and the Florida Governor’s Executive Order 95-359.

Transportation projects

must be evaluated to determine if the AN process applies. The process for
screening project for AN applicability is shown in Figure 3-4.
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Figure 3-4
Decision Process for AN Process Applicability
Needs determination
Modernization requiring no additional
right of way on existing highways by
resurfacing, minor right-of-way
acquisition, widening less than a single
lane width, adding shoulders,
landscaping, rest areas in a nonYes urbanized area, adding auxiliary lanes
for localized purposes, increasing
superelevations, skid hazard
resurfacing, restoration and
rehabilitation, median development,
bridge widening (unless permits are
required), additional bridge deck
pavement layers?
No
Lighting, signing, pavement markings,
signalization, freeway surveillance and
Yes control systems, railroad protective
devices, break-away posts, progressive
signal systems, pedestrian safety
improvements?
No
Safety projects, and others such as
grooving, glare screen, safety barriers,
Yes guardrails, energy attenuators, removal
of signs, removal of roadside obstacles,
removal of trees, addition of fog
devices, and correction of road safety
hazards?
No
Reconstruction of existing crossroad or
railroad separations, railway/highway
Yes
crossings, minor improvement or
replacement of existing drainage
structures, minor alterations or
extensions of existing highway?
Yes

Project on new location?
Yes

Change in functional
No
characteristics or significant
change in access?
Yes
Significant impact on social, No
cultural, or natural
environment?
Yes
Construction or
No
Reconstruction of waterway
or significant wetland?
Yes
Non-Federally funded project No
requiring SEIR?
Yes
Involve controversy,
substantial environmental
alteration or community
impacts?
Yes
Project MUST follow AN
Process

No
Non-Major State Actions?
No
Project is EXEMPT
from AN Process
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No

No

The AN process is facilitated through the use of the AN Fact Sheet (Figure
3-5). This form is completed for the initial dissemination of the AN.

Figure 3-5
Advance Notification Fact Sheet
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Another possible element of the initial efforts can include the decision to
implement the Local Agency Program (LAP) process. The FDOT can contract
with other governmental agencies for transportation services provided to the
traveling public. Local governments must be LAP certified before entering into
this process.

This program includes the involvement of the FHWA in the

contractual relationships between the Department and Local Agencies. The use
of LAP has dramatically increased over the past few years as the FDOT
struggles with inadequate resources and funding to accomplish its planning
efforts using their own staff and consultants. As the use of the LAP increases,
there is a dependency, from the FDOT, on city or county staff to provide all of the
required expertise necessary to satisfactorily conduct a PD&E study.

It is also important to consider privately funded projects during initial
coordination with other agencies.

In Florida, more agencies are looking to

Public-Private-Partnerships as a means to accelerate project construction and to
aid with funding delays or deficits. Currently, privately funded projects use their
own processes to document compliance with NEPA.

However, in many

instances, there may be a high likelihood of transference of ownership of a
certain facility.
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3.1.2 Existing Data Collection Phase

The Data Collection Phase includes collection of all existing data or
procurement of new data that will be required to accurately assess alternatives.
This phase also includes the Class of Action (COA) determination once enough
data is collected to assess significance of issues associated with the
improvement.

The NEPA established that the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), the
Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) and the Categorical Exclusion (CATEX)
would serve as the administrative record of compliance with its policies and
procedures for federally funded project.

It further determined that the State

Environmental Impact Report (SEIR) and the Non-Major State Action (NMSA)
would serve as the record of compliance for non-federally funded projects. The
decision as to which level of documentation is appropriate is made by the FDOT
in consultation with the FHWA.

The EIS is the appropriate level of

documentation for actions that “significantly” affect the human environment. The
normal types of projects that fall into this category are a new controlled-access
freeway, a highway project of four or more lanes on a new location, new
construction or extension of fixed rail transit facilities, and new construction or
extension of a separate roadway for buses or high occupancy vehicles. An EA is
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prepared for projects in which the environmental impact is not known. The EA is
prepared in order to determine what level of document is required.

The administration of NEPA is typically done by the Federal Highway
Administration or, in some cases, by other federal transportation agencies such
as the FRA, the FAA, or the FTA. The lead state agency is typically the FDOT.
It can be a specific county or city given the proper delegation of administrative
authority by the FDOT. This can be accomplished through the LAP.

The determination of class of action begins with a review of the responses
received during the AN process. After evaluation of the comments received, the
FHWA is consulted and the COA is determined.

In some cases, the COA

determination may be delayed until later in the project development process in
order to collect more data and better determine impacts associated with a project
as alternatives are developed.

The primary documentation of the COA

determination is the Environmental Class of Action Determination form. Potential
impacts of a particular project are used as the qualitative metric in order to
determine the COA. Page 3 of the form (Figure 3-6) lists the considerations
when evaluating a project.
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Figure 3-6
Class of Action Form – Page 3

These factors are qualitatively evaluated as being Significant, Minimal,
None, or No Involvement. They are defined in Table 3-1.
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Table 3-1
COA Impact Factors
Term

Definition
The perceived impact is significant in the sense of the use of
Significant
the term by CEQ regulations.
The project involves an environmental issue and has a
Minimal
perceived impact, which may range in level of magnitude
varying from minor to substantial.
The project has been evaluated for an environmental issue;
None
the issue exists but there is little or no impact
The environmental issue in question is not a part of or in
No Involvement
anyway involved with the project.
Based upon the evaluation of these individual criteria, a COA
determination is made.

3.1.3 Existing Analysis Phase

The Analysis Phase includes the development of alternatives, the analysis
of environmental, social, and engineering impacts associated with the
alternatives, the screening of the alternatives based upon the impacts, and public
involvement efforts, usually in the form of a Public Workshop or Public
Information Meeting.

A major element of this phase is the development of reasonable and
feasible alternatives, which must be discussed (Figure 3-7) in the COA (CEQ
1978).

A critical component of this phase is the documentation of which

alternatives are reasonable and feasible and which are eliminated early in the
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process for not meeting established criteria and all necessary background
information and analysis used in the decision-making process.

Figure 3-7
COA Discussion Items
1. Thoroughly and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives and document
why alternatives are eliminated.
2. Provide enough details and analysis for reviewers to completely evaluate
individual alternatives.
3. Include reasonable and feasible alternatives that are not within the purview of
the lead agency.
4. Clearly identify the preferred alternative
5. Mitigate the preferred alternatives as necessary
6. Include the no-build alternative

The alternatives discussion section generally discusses four types of
solutions which include the no-build (no-action) alternative, the Transportation
System Management (TSM) alternatives, the multimodal alternatives, and any
construction alternatives. A construction alternative must be consistent with local
comprehensive plans.

An important consideration during this phase is corridor preservation. It is
the intent of the corridor analysis process to evaluate alternative corridors where
deemed reasonable and feasible. Alternative corridors are typically considered
reasonable and feasible if the existing or currently preferred corridor would
experience significant impacts as a result of the proposed project. In order to
avoid these impacts, other existing or new corridors may be considered.
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Considerations of a new corridor traditionally include community values
and concerns, contamination, archaeological or historical sites, publicly owned
lands, threatened and endangered species, and wetlands.

The corridor

preservation procedure is defined in the FDOT PD&E Manual and consists of
four primary steps (Figure 3-8).

Figure 3-8
Corridor Preservation Procedure
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The process begins with a component of the Florida Transportation Plan
(FTP) that designates corridors that are necessary for future development and
needs.

The FDOT will prepare a Corridor Designation Report (CDR) or its

equivalent. An approved NEPA document, a state level environmental report, or
other approved master or modal system plan can serve as an equivalent
document to the CDR (FDOT Topic No. 525-030-201). The process continues
with an environmental assessment of the proposed corridor through the Corridor
Planning and Design Report (CPDR) or its equivalent (FDOT Topic No. 525-030137).

One of the most important steps in any PD&E study is to establish
evaluation criteria.

There are many factors that are typically evaluated.

In

Florida, they are standardized, as outlined in the PD&E Manual. These criteria
are shown in Table 3-2.

Table 3-2
Standard PD&E Evaluation Criteria
Criteria

Assessment

Community Impacts

Social, economic, land use, aesthetic/livability, relocation
issues, and compliance with civil rights

Air Quality

Existing/future conditions and determining if the project
conforms to the Clean Air Act
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Table 3-2 (Continued)
Standard PD&E Evaluation Criteria
Noise

Noise levels and if they meet criteria reasonable and
feasible noise abatement

Wetlands

Avoidance, minimization and mitigation of short-term and
long-term impacts

Water Quality

Prevention, reduction and/or elimination of pollution of
ground and surface water

Wildlife/Habitat
Impacts

Identification/Protection of threatened and/or endangered
species and their habitat

Contamination

Identification and evaluation of potential contamination
problems within and/or adjacent to a project

Floodplains

Avoidance, minimization and mitigation of encroachment
within the floodplain

Archaeological &
Historical

Significance of sites and avoidance methods for projects
involving recreation lands/historic/archaeological features

Section 4(f)
Properties

Protection and preservation of the natural beauty of the
countryside, public parks, recreation lands, wildlife and
waterfowl refuges, and historic sites

Conceptual Design

Development and evaluation of engineering design
concepts for environmental compatibility and satisfaction
of the transportation need

Public Involvement

Informing and involving all stakeholders about the
planned project using a Public Involvement Program

Aquatic Preserves

Impacts to sovereignty submerged lands that are to be
preserved

Wild & Scenic
Rivers

Impacts to those water bodies designated as wild river
areas, scenic river areas, or recreational river areas

Outstanding Florida
Waterways (OFW)

Impacts to specially designated water bodies in Florida
that have outstanding natural attributes
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Table 3-2 (Continued)
Standard PD&E Evaluation Criteria
Farmlands

Impact to farmlands as designated by the Natural
Resource Conservation Service (NRCS)

Scenic Highways

Impacts to the natural, physical, visual and cultural
qualities of transportation facilities such as highway

Construction
Impacts

Impacts to the local community as a result of the actual
construction of the transportation project

Visual & Aesthetic
Impacts

Aesthetic effect of the proposed project on a community

Essential Fish
Habitat (EFH)

Impact to fish habitat that involves anadromous and
certain important marine species of fish

Coastal Barrier
Resource
Evaluation

Impact to designated undeveloped coastal barriers and
their associated aquatic habitat

Utilities & Railroads

Conflicts between the transportation project and existing
and future utilities, railroads, and their users

Permits

Early coordination to determine if project is permittable

Impacts of the transportation project on different types of
Bicycle & Pedestrian
existing non-motorized transportation modes along with
Impacts
the potential impacts of future non-motorized modes
Compliance with the FDOT’s plan for preservation of
specific transportation corridors, which may include
advanced right-of-way acquisition

Corridor
Preservation

One of the tools that are used to employ these evaluation criteria is called
the Efficient Transportation Decision Making (ETDM) Process. In response to
TEA-21

and

in

response

to

Florida’s

citizens

wanting

faster

project

implementation, the Florida Department of Transportation has initiated the ETDM
Process which addresses alternatives screening from the planning phase
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through permitting. The main tool associated with this process in an Internetaccessible interactive database called the Environmental Screening Tool (EST).
Two main alternatives screening milestones occur in the process (FDOT
ETDM Overview 2005).

These are known as the Planning Screen and the

Programming Screen. The Planning Screen occurs in conjunction with the costfeasible plans and the Programming Screen occurs before projects are
considered for the FDOT Work Program. The Programming Screen is the more
detailed of the two phases and is intended to identify technical issues that must
be addressed by project staff, agencies, and other stakeholders.
Another screening tool that is used is the Environmental Technical
Advisory Team (ETAT). The Florida Department of Transportation is divided into
seven geographic districts. Each of these districts has an ETAT. The ETAT
consists of agency representatives or anyone having statutory responsibility for
consultation as defined by NEPA. The ETAT’s responsibility is to interact with
the FDOT throughout the life cycle of a project.

The ETAT does contain

members of law enforcement and emergency response.

One of the early

guidelines of ETDM established that each agency was responsible to ensure the
validity of data in existing databases and to update as necessary to ensure
accuracy.
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The evaluation of these alternatives usually takes the form of an
evaluation matrix (Figure 3-9).

This matrix is a combination of quantitative

comparisons, usually in the form of costs, and of qualitative factors, such as a
determination of involvement or not.

Figure 3-9
Evaluation Matrix Criteria
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Construction costs
Right-of-way costs
Engineering costs (Design and C.E.I.)
Business damages
Bicycle and pedestrian facilities
Traffic control
Environmental impacts (noise, air, 4(f), contamination sites, trees, etc.)
Socioeconomic (R/W requirements, relocations, aesthetics, traffic flow
improvements, neighborhood and social impacts, etc.)
9. Operational analysis

3.1.4 Existing Finalization Phase

The Finalization Phase includes the selection of a Preferred Alternative,
public involvement efforts in the form of a Public Hearing, and final
documentation of the study in the form of an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS), an Environmental Assessment (EA), a Type 1 or 2 Categorical Exclusion
(CATEX), or a Programmatic for Federally funded projects. For non-federally
funded projects, the documentation takes the form of a State Environmental
Impact Report (SEIR) or a Non-Major State Action (NMSA).
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The alternatives development and analysis efforts are documented in the
Preliminary Engineering Report (PER) and in the Location Hydraulics Report
(LHR).

They can be supported by several other documents including the

Wetlands Evaluation Report (WER), the Endangered Species Biological
Assessment Report (ESBA), the Cultural Resource Assessment Survey (CRAS),
the Preliminary Pond Siting Report (PSR), the Noise Report, and the
Contamination Screening Evaluation Report (CSER). This study will not review
these support documents in any detail but will instead focus on the PER, which
serves as a culmination of all of those efforts.

All

Draft

Environmental

Impact

Statements

(DEIS)

and

Final

Environmental Impact Statements (FEIS) are circulated to a determined group of
government agencies for their review. This is done to satisfy the “Implementing
Procedural Provisions” of NEPA found in CEQ, Section 1502.10(i)). The list of
reviewers is developed by the Central Environmental Management Office
(CEMO) in cooperation with the FHWA and the District Environmental
Management Offices (DEMO). This list of reviewers will change project to project
depending on the geographical location and the specific project issues expected
to be encountered.

The PD&E Manual lists the agencies that must be

considered when developing the reviewer list. The agencies are shown in Table
3-3.
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Table 3-3
Suggested DEIS And FEIS Reviewers
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation - Office of Cultural Resources
Preservation
Appropriate local planning agencies
Appropriate Metropolitan Planning Organization
Appropriate Regional Planning Council
Colorado State University - The Libraries, Documents Librarian
Federal Aviation Administration - Airports District Office
Federal Aviation Administration - Regional Director
Federal Emergency Management Agency - Associate General Counsel for
Insurance and Mitigation
Federal Emergency Management Agency - Natural Hazards Branch, Chief
Florida Department of Community Affairs Federal Railroad Administration - Office
of Economic Analysis, Director
Florida Department of Environmental Protection
Florida Department of Health
Florida Department of State - Division of Historical Resources
Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission
Police Department
United States Army Corps of Engineers - Regulatory Branch, District Engineer
United States Coast Guard - Commander (oan) - Seventh District
United States Coast Guard - Commander (obr) - Eighth District
United States Department of Agriculture - Natural Resources Conservation
Service, State Conservationist
United States Department of Agriculture - Southern Regional Forester
United States Department of Commerce - National Marine Fisheries Service Habitat Conservation Division
United States Department of Commerce - National Marine Fisheries Service Southeast Regional Office
United States Department of Commerce - National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development - Regional
Environmental Officer
United States Department of Interior - Bureau of Indian Affairs - Office of Trust
Responsibilities
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Table 3-3 (Continued)
Suggested DEIS And FEIS Reviewers
United States Department of Interior - Bureau of Land Management - Eastern
States Office
United States Department of Interior - Fish and Wildlife Service, Field Supervisor
United States Department of Interior - National Park Service - Southeast
Regional Office
United States Department of Interior - Office of Environmental Policy and
Compliance, Director
United States Department of Interior - United States Geological Survey Chief
United States Department of State - Office of Environment, Health and Natural
Resources
United States Dept. of Health and Human Services - Center for Environmental
Health and Injury Control
United States Environmental Protection Agency - Region IV, Regional
Administrator
United States Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C.
Water Management District
3.1.5 Existing Informational Phase

The Informational Phase involves the dissemination of the final
commitments and recommendations to all appropriate agencies and to the public
and other stakeholders. The distribution of these final elements is accomplished
by the use of the same mailing list that is discussed in the AN process. Other
means of notifying the public are employed such as newspaper advertisements
and putting the final documents on display at public libraries.
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3.1.6 Existing Public Involvement Considerations

The intent of the public involvement process is to inform the public about a
specific transportation project.

It provides opportunities for stakeholders to

provide input into the decision-making process. The FDOT PD&E Manual states,

“An effective public involvement plan can foster understanding and
cooperation between the Department and the public; help develop
a transportation system that meets real community needs; saves
money by reducing or eliminating the need to redesign; and prevent
last minute blow-ups or delays because of unresolved issues.”

The key to the process is in its comprehensive nature. Public involvement
during the planning and programming phases is done to accomplish several
things. These include determination of priorities, identification of social/economic
impacts associated with projects, and identification of additional needs or wants
associated with the proposed projects. (Virginia Department of Transportation
2004) Public involvement during planning phases deals more with projects and
features whereas public involvement during programming deals more with
prioritization and funding of solutions.

The requirements for public involvement are derived from Federal
requirements for transportation planning (23 U.S.C. 134(g)(4) and 23 U.S.C.
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135(e)(3)) mandating that public involvement must employ proactive practices
within the context of systematic processes;

Public involvement processes

provide complete information, timely public notice, full public access to key
decisions, and supports early and continuing involvement of the public in
developing Statewide and metropolitan transportation plans and programs;
public involvement involves a holistic understanding of the environment and
community culture; and public involvement processes must be consistent with
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990.
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Chapter 4
Survey Results And Analysis

Due to the developing nature of security planning nationally and due to the
complexity of the project development process in Florida, it was important to
provide some relevant background regarding perceptions with respect to
transportation security planning, both nationally and in Florida.
Two methods were used to establish this background. The first was a
letter that was mailed to transportation leaders across the nation, and the second
was an online questionnaire that was completed by professionals and general
public, all of whom are residents of Florida. This chapter reports on the results of
these two instruments.

4.1

State Request Letter

The State Request Letter, shown in Appendix C, was mailed in November
of 2003. This letter was mailed to all 50 states, the District of Columbia and
Puerto Rico. The intent of this letter was to:


Establish a contact list of personnel currently dealing with security issues in
each state.
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Determine the level of effort for each state when dealing with security issues.



Indicate a state in which to conduct this research based upon development in
that state and interest level of its staff.



Get an initial indication of the validity of the research.



Get an initial indication of the utility of the research.

4.1.1 State Request Letter Responses

The results (Table 4-1) are documented as No Response, Mailed
Response, Emailed Response, or Phone Interview. In the case of a response,
information is provided to indicate the agencies response and any information
provided.

Table 4-1
Request Letter Responses
California
Connecticut

Florida

Mailed Response: Gathered and forwarded data concerning security
measures/efforts currently being used.
Mailed Response: They stated they do not "incorporate security consideration in
its transportation planning and decision-making processes". However, they did
express interest in receiving the final results of this research effort.
Phone Interview: They stated that they do not consider security issues during
planning. They recommended I speak with the emergency management agencies.
They mentioned the possibility for ETDM screening for security. They forwarded
information on sea port security and guidelines for implementation of flexible airport
funding, They mostly funded projects related to security, like fencing, camera
systems, lighting, etc. They are participating in conference call with other states.
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Table 4-1 (Continued)
Request Letter Responses
Georgia

Indiana

Kentucky

New
Mexico
New York

Ohio

Mailed Response: Stated they are unwilling to participate at this time.
Mailed Response: They stated that their planning/project programming process is
carried systematically by means of a blend of activities-some more judgment-based
(such as reliance on our district personnel's field experience and interaction with local
officials and the public), some more analytically based (such as continual evaluation
of the entire state highway network using FHWA's Highway Economic Requirements
System, or HERS program)-to arrive at a list of candidate projects. They mentioned
that transportation security may be an explicit factor at the project alternatives'
assessment level (e.g., redundancy in major river crossings). They stated that the
DOT, as a matter of policy and standards, designs into its facilities risk-reduction
measures for such things as floods (e.g., bridges designed to convey specific,
infrequent flood events) and earthquakes (e.g., bridges in SW Indiana receive
enhanced earthquake load design requirements).
Phone Interview: They stated that they have 2 MPO's that border military bases, Ft.
Campbell and Ft. Knox. They work with representatives from each through their
committees. Airport for Ft. Campbell affected intersection because of flight line. ITS
branch handles part of it. There are 15 area development districts, which are local
planning offices. These districts deal with Safety as part of agenda. They have only
had presentations about security but it is not part of their normal focus. Unique issue
is planning of vice presidential debate held in Danfield where they worked closely
with security forces to assess needs including parking garages and speech needs.
Phone Interview: State has formed a "security task force" to deal with security
issues.
Emailed Response: They stated that they are unsure of the organizational structure
in terms of security planning and that they were not aware of any single point of
contact because it is being handled by several departments. They are currently
consolidating policy.
Mailed Response: Forwarded copy of "draft" chapter on "Transportation Security"
from their Long Range Plan. The information summarizes ODOT's program,
policies, and procedures relative to security.
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Table 4-1 (Continued)
Request Letter Responses

Oregon

Pennsylvania

Tennessee
Washington

Washington
DC

Mailed Response: They forwarded information from draft guidelines that they
were preparing concerning security operations as part of the Oregon
Transportation Plan. They have formed a committee structure to discuss
security. The committee structure includes a Steering Committee and 3 policy
committees, one of which is entitled Safety and Security.
Phone Interview: They do work in emergency response. They are structured as
highway department. They have Volpe center doing a gap analysis to look at
where they are, best practices, current guidance for transportation security. One
areas already touching on was confidentiality of bridge plans but haven’t started
changing bridge plans. They will identify critical infrastructure, do common sense
types of things. Nothing yet on planning & programming. One thing to come out
of study will be organizational structure issues. Are amateurs going to do the
jobs of professionals? On highway side may involve tunnels, bridges, facilities.
They also run DMV and there is licensing, stolen plates, etc... issues. Motor
carriers carrying inappropriate materials, bad routes, improper labels. Planning &
Programming will be focused on highway side. How to deal with funding,
emergency response, training, material, location beyond the normal natural
disaster. One issue that they deal with is nuclear generating stations that they
have. Who plows radioactive snow? They have been talking to different states
to find out what each state is doing differently, how they are organized and what
advice can they give to Pennsylvania DOT. They are only dealing with broad
brush themes. Some states have staff devoted full time looking for money. They
contacted only select states that are considered leaders.
Phone Interview: They responded with a list of contacts concerning security
response efforts.
Phone Interview: They responded with a list of contacts concerning security
response efforts. They have developed a “Gray Note Book”, which is used as an
accountability tool.
Phone Interview: They stated that security was being discussed from 2 different
perspectives (1) infrastructure protection and (2) emergency preparedness.
They are discussing ITS regional architecture, partnerships, stakeholders that
cross all disciplines, similar to hurricane arena.

Request letters were mailed to all 50 states, the District of Columbia and
Puerto Rico. Of those 52 entities, 14 responded in some fashion (Figure 4-1).
The states that responded include California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Indiana, Kentucky, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Washington, and Washington, D.C. This equates to a 27% response
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rate. Of those responding, only Georgia declined participation or discussion of
security planning.

4.1.2 Request Letter Analysis

The first objective of the State Request Letter was to establish a list of
personnel currently dealing with security issues in each state. As a result of this
effort, a contact database was generated and is contained in Appendix B. A
more long-term benefit of this effort is that this contact list can be used in further
analysis of this topic area.
Another purpose of developing this list of planning, security, and
emergency management personnel was to establish the level of effort that each
state is putting forth in the area of transportation security planning. As evidenced
by the responses, only a very few states had initiated efforts along this path.
Most of the states that responded were investing the majority of their efforts and
funding towards operations and maintenance and were concerned with
retrofitting their existing facilities.
Also, based upon the responses and the activity of each state with regards
to transportation security planning, the results of this effort confirmed the
approach of using Florida and their processes as the basis of study and analysis
for this research effort.
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This request letter, through the lack of response and indication of little
effort being expended by the states, demonstrated that this is a topic area that is
largely unexplored nationally. Of the 52 letters mailed, 38 states (approximately
73%) did not respond to multiple efforts to contact them regarding the subject.
This clearly demonstrated the validity of the research effort. There was also a
large interest, from those states that responded, to receive the results of this
research effort. All of the states that responded, except for Georgia, gave an
initial indication that this research had utility in their states.

Figure 4-1
State Request Letter Response

Legend
No Response
Participated
Did Not Participate
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4.2

Online Questionnaire

The online questionnaire (http://home.earthlink.net/~securityplanning/)
was developed and administered to obtain general public perceptions about
security concerns in Florida. Public perception is an important consideration as
related to the Project Development Process in Florida. Public Involvement is
mandated throughout the process and, as long as there are no overriding safety
concerns involved, can greatly influence the outcome of a PD&E Study. It is
necessary to consider the results of the online questionnaire as a means of
understanding the perceptions about security that Floridians possess and how
that may affect the project development process.

There were some basic

principles (Figure 4-2) revealed with respect to how Floridians perceive
transportation planning in their state.

Figure 4-2
Online Questionnaire Observations
Floridians feel fairly safe
Some advances in Security are being made

Overall sense of loss of control over security
Floridians will participate in security programs
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Chapter 5
Revised Project Development Process

This chapter will serve as a supplement to Florida’s PD&E Manual and will
address how to adequately consider and incorporate transportation security into
Florida’s PD&E process. The Project Development Process has been modified,
as shown in Figure 5-1, to reflect those considerations. The following sections
will address each of those steps, identify the “Deficiency” associated with each
step, determine a “Security Solution” to properly deal with the deficiency, and
then explain the “Benefit” of the solution.
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Figure 5-1
Revised Project Development Process
Need
Initialization
Phase

Advance
Notification
Existing
Conditions

Data
Collection
Phase

Class Of
Action
Alternatives
Development

Environmental
Impacts

Social
Impacts

Engineering
Impacts

Security
Impacts

Analysis
Phase

Alternatives
Screening
Public
Workshop
Select Preferred
Alternative
Public
Hearing
LEGEND
Modified Process
Existing Process

Finalization
Phase

Documentation
Publication
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Informational
Phase

5.1

Revised Initialization Phase
The AN Process should be modified to eliminate certain exclusions

(Figure 5-2).

Figure 5-2
Project Type Exclusion Modification

Deficiency: The exclusion of certain types projects from the AN process
allows a project, especially a safety or signalization project, to progress
without review from critical security agencies. This is especially
important when many signalization projects now involve advanced
technologies such as ITS and complicated fiber optic networks.

Security Solution: Safety projects, signalization projects and NonMajor State Actions (NMSA) must comply with the Advance Notification
(AN) process.

Benefit: All projects will be reviewed for security concerns. This will
ensure coordination and communication and no projects will fall in the
gaps.

The AN response system should be modified to provide an active
response requirement (Figure 5-3).
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Figure 5-3
AN Response System Modification
Deficiency: The AN response system is a passive response system
and any agency failing to respond is considered to have no concerns or
involvement.

Security Solution: Implement an active response system that requires
a written response from all agencies on the distribution list, regardless
of involvement in the project.

Benefit: This will ensure review by qualified personnel.
concerns will not fall victim to lack of time or personnel.

Security

The AN Fact Sheet should be modified to add a section providing security
comments (Figure 5-4). The form should be modified as shown in Figure 5-5.
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Figure 5-4
AN Fact Sheet Modification
Deficiency: The AN Fact Sheet does not currently contain a specific
section for discussion of security considerations.

Security Solution: Modify the AN Fact Sheet to include a section to
indicate whether the project may involve critical infrastructure, critical
corridors, or other potential targets of terrorist acts.

Benefit: All agencies will know about the potential security concerns
and allocate resources more efficiently and effectively.

Figure 5-5
Modified AN Form

_________________________________________________
6.

Security: Does this project involve critical
infrastructure, critical corridors, or other potential
targets of terrorist acts?
_______Yes

________No

The AN process should be modified to not require inclusion of any
graphical exhibit that may represent sensitive security information (Figure 5-6).
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Figure 5-6
Graphical Exhibit Modification
Deficiency: The current process requires certain graphical elements to
orient the recipient to the project and its associated issues.

Security Solution: Do not include graphical or detailed representation
of any security sensitive sites, those that are deemed “Critical
Infrastructure” by the State of Florida, in the Advance Notification (AN)
package or any other published document. Rely on the security agency
to review their secure databases and provide a fatal flaw analysis of the
project.

Benefit: This will protect sensitive information and reduce the risk of
additional circulation of AN.

The LAP Program should be modified to require ETAT review of all
projects conducted using the program (Figure 5-7).
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Figure 5-7
LAP Program Modification
Deficiency: As the use of the LAP increases, there is a dependency,
from the FDOT, on city or county staff to provide all of the required
expertise necessary to satisfactorily conduct a PD&E study. Most cities
and counties do not have the adequately trained personnel to deal with
security concerns on a state level.

Security Solution: Require all LAP participants to adhere to all of the
security considerations discussed in this research and that their ability
to implement these considerations is a deciding factor in their LAP
approval.

Benefit: This will reinforce the core process and allow a complete
review of projects, regardless of funding sources.

The private development process should be modified to require
compliance with all FDOT requirements (Figure 5-8).
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Figure 5-8
Private Development Modification
Deficiency: In Florida, more and more agencies are looking to PublicPrivate-Partnerships as a means to accelerate project construction and
to aid with funding delays or deficits. Currently, privately funded
projects use their own processes to document compliance with NEPA.

Security Solution: Require privately funded projects to adhere to the
same processes involving security review as those publicly funded
projects, especially if there is any potential for transference of
ownership of the facility to the government. Make demonstration of
compliance with FDOT processes mandatory before ownership can be
transferred.

Benefit: This will protect the FDOT from liability associated with lack of
due diligence regarding security concerns.

Local comprehensive planning efforts should reflect security planning
elements (Figure 5-9).
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Figure 5-9
Local Comprehensive Planning Modification
Deficiency: A proposed alternative must be consistent with local
planning efforts when establishing need. Currently, local plans do not
contain a security element not does it address security concerns on
specific projects mentioned in their planning efforts.

Security Solution: The local planning efforts must be updated to reflect
the necessary short-term and long-term security needs for their
regions.
Otherwise, proposed alternatives involving security
considerations cannot be consistent with local planning efforts.

Benefit: This will force local governments to direct resources towards
identification and planning of critical assets.

5.2

Revised Data Collection Phase
The COA form should be modified to reflect security impacts (Figure

5-10). The resulting form should include those items shown in Figure 5-11.

104

Figure 5-10
COA Form Modification

Deficiency: The current COA form does not reflect any consideration of
transportation security in its evaluation of appropriate level of effort or
documentation in the PD&E process.

Security Solution: The potential risk to the proposed project from either
a man-made or natural disaster should be included in the determination
of the level of study required to analyze the project. A section should be
added to the COA form, page 3, in Section 6 (“Impact Evaluation”) that
addresses security concerns for a particular proposed project.

Benefit: This will allow a security concern to dictate the COA of a
particular project and thereby potentially allow a greater level of
analysis.
Figure 5-11
Modified COA Form
F. SECURITY
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Stand-Off Distance
Access Restriction
Time on Target Reduction
Protection of Key Elements
Role in Economy
Replacement Cost
Lost Time
Visibility
National Symbol
National Defense
Site Hazards
Interdependency
Maintenance
Operations
Vulnerability
Community Impact
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5.3

Revised Analysis Phase
The corridor analysis process should be modified to consider security

needs (Figure 5-12). The list of reviewers should list those shown in Table 5-1.

Figure 5-12
Corridor Analysis Modification
Deficiency: Security should a primary consideration when considering
a new corridor. Related to corridor analysis is the concept of corridor
preservation. The FDOT has established a procedure for preserving
land for the future needs of infrastructure and the transportation
systems. As development in Florida accelerates, there is a great
potential for development of land that, due to geographic location, is
critical to the future needs of Florida’s transportation network. This
process does not currently provide for security as a viable motivation for
corridor preservation.

Security Solution: Security experts should review the proposed
corridors for potential concerns or fatal flaws. Amend the corridor
preservation process to allow for advanced right-of-way acquisition, or
at least easements acquisition, to preserve the continuity of necessary
transportation corridors from both connectivity and security
perspectives.

Benefit: This will ensure review by qualified personnel.
concerns will not fall victim to lack of resources.

106

Security

Table 5-1
Recommended Security Agency Reviewers
1. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA)
2. Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)
3. Federal Transit Administration (FTA)
4. Maritime Administration (MARAD)
5. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
6. Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)
7. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
8. Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
9. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
10. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Office of National Security
Coordination
11. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Preparedness Division
12. Local Emergency Management Agencies
The ETDM tool should be modified to provide a security screening module
(Figure 5-13).

Figure 5-13
ETDM Modification
Deficiency: The ETDM does not currently use any security based
evaluation criteria for identification or project issues nor do any security
qualified personnel participate in the electronic screening efforts.

Security Solution: A security screening module should be included in
the program that would allow security experts to be involved in the
process of screening alternatives. This module should be attached to
both the Planning and Programming Screens.

Benefit: This would allow those security personnel assigned to the
ETAT to review the project with regards to security and provide selection
of the best alternative.

107

The ETAT membership should be modified to require participation of
security experts on the committee (Figure 5-14).

Figure 5-14
ETAT Membership Modification
Deficiency: The ETAT does contain members of law enforcement and
emergency response, but does not include anyone who is trained and
qualified to make security assessments.

Security Solution: Because of the internet based review process, it
would be simple for an expert, located anywhere in the United States, to
review projects. Therefore, require a representative from the same
agencies that are added to the review phase also participate
electronically via the internet.

Benefit: This would ensure that a properly qualified individual is
reviewing projects for security concerns and allow rapid update of that
information via the internet.
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A GIS layer should be developed to represent critical infrastructure and
other facilities that represent security considerations (Figure 5-15).

Figure 5-15
GIS Layer Modification
Deficiency: The ETDM screening tools depend on members on the
team to ensure accuracy of data available from their own respective
agencies for screening alternatives. There currently exists no data
layer available with regards to critical infrastructure because there is no
security representation either in ETAT or the ETDM process.

Security Solution: This data could consist of Geographic Information
System (GIS) data or other data deemed relevant. The FDOT should
develop a security based, GIS layer that could be easily overlaid onto
proposed projects as an initial screening tool to determine fatal flaws in
proposed projects or alternatives.

Benefit: This will allow ETAT members to determine fatal flaws with
particular projects or alternatives early in the process and continuously
throughout the process.
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The evaluation matrix should be modified to account for security costs and
considerations (Figure 5-16).

Figure 5-16
Evaluation Matrix Modification
Deficiency: The evaluation matrix and the minimum requirements for
such, used to evaluate alternatives, do not consider security issues in
the evaluation of alternatives.

Security Solution: Include the following factors in the evaluation matrix:
(1) Overall cost of security provisions, which would consist of all design,
construction, maintenance, and operations costs associated with
recommended improvements to protect infrastructure, and (2) a
qualitative assessment of whether a particular alternative involves a
higher likelihood of attractiveness or vulnerability as a result of
recommended improvements.

Benefit: This will indicate to the public that there are security concerns
associated with particular alternatives and allow them to see the
impacts of those concerns on the decision making process.
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The list of standard evaluation criteria should be modified to reflect
security considerations (Figure 5-17). The list should include the 16 factors listed
in Table 5-2.

Figure 5-17
Evaluation Factors Modification
Deficiency: There are many evaluation factors that are typically
evaluated in Florida. They are largely standardized and are outlined in
the PD&E Manual. There are no evaluation criteria for security
considerations.

Security Solution: Include a list of standard security evaluation criteria
in the overall list of evaluation criteria.

Benefit: These new criteria will provide both qualitative and quantitative
measures that will allow a proper screening of alternatives based on
security concerns.
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Table 5-2
Security Evaluation Criteria
Criteria
Stand-Off
Distance

Evaluation
Cost associated
with provision of
adequate stand-off
distance (Sufficient
distance as
determined by the
most current
criteria).

Costs




Acquisition of
additional rightof-way not
required
otherwise
Modification of
horizontal
alignment

Benefits





Access
Restriction

Time-onTarget

Cost associated
with the limitation of
access to critical
areas such as
transportation
system or adjacent
critical
infrastructure (i.e.
petroleum tank
farms, chemical
plants)
Cost associated
with the reduction
of allowable delay
time along specific
corridors that may
be within the
allowable stand-off
distance











Limitation of

access
(connecting

facilities)

Improved barrier
systems to
prevent
deviation from
established
corridors
Reduction of
facility features
(shoulders on
roadways)
Increased
speed limits
Increased
enforcement
activity
Increased
surveillance
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Corridor
preservation
Increased
corridor security
Reduction of
primary and
secondary
impacts to
transportation
facility and
adjacent
facilities
Reduced
vulnerability
Reduced
vulnerability
Detection
Deterrence

Increased
security
Reduced
vulnerability
Deterrence

Table 5-2 (Continued)
Security Evaluation Criteria
Criteria

Evaluation

Protection of
Key Elements

Cost of protection
of critical
infrastructure
through attack on
key elements such
as bridge pilings.
Impact of loss of
the facility or of
reduced capacity
on the local or
regional economy.
This is a qualitative
factor that can be
assessed as Low,
Medium, or High for
comparative
purposes.
Evaluate the
potential cost to
replace the
infrastructure.
Cost associated
with increased
travel time or other
delays caused by
the loss of the
facility.

Economic
Role

Replacement
Cost

Lost Time

Visibility

Costs






Benefits

Hardening costs
Increased
maintenance
costs



Redundancy
Network
Development














Value
assessments
Updates to
assessments
Travel time
studies
Redundancy

Applies to manmade and
natural disasters



Applies to manmade and
natural disasters
Network
flexibility
Multi-use
capability
Applies to manmade and
natural disasters
Accurate
budgeting
Efficient funding
allocation


Value
assessments
Identification of
public concerns
Monitoring of
public opinion
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Applies to manmade and
natural disasters
Accurate
budgeting
Efficient funding
allocation
Encourage
asset hardening
by other parties





Costs associated

with economic
losses, caused by a 
loss of a facility,
associated with

public perception.

Applies to manmade and
natural disasters
Reduced
vulnerability





Table 5-2 (Continued)
Security Evaluation Criteria
Criteria
National
Symbol

National
Defense

Evaluation
Impact associated
with the loss of a
facility deemed a
national symbol.
This is a qualitative
factor that can be
assessed as Low,
Medium, or High for
comparative
purposes. Any
alternative ranking
Medium or High
should not be
considered
feasible.
Importance of the
facility to national
defense, primarily
related to
transportation of
needed resources.
Facilities that are
on Strategic
Highway Network
(STRAHNET). This
is a qualitative
factor that can be
assessed as Low,
Medium, or High for
comparative
purposes.

Costs









Benefits

Access
restrictions
Route circuity
Hardening
Shielding




National morale
Encourage
asset hardening
by other parties

Priority
treatment
Design
restrictions
Higher
standards



Protects
STRAHNET
Allows
increased
response
efficiency
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Table 5-2 (Continued)
Security Evaluation Criteria
Criteria

Evaluation

Site Hazards

Impacts associated
with the specific
site conditions.
This may include
increased
secondary
damages resulting
from on-site
storage of
hazardous
materials. This is a
qualitative factor
that can be
assessed as Low,
Medium, or High for
comparative
purposes. The
ranges for each
category will be
determined by the
types of hazards
present.
Costs associated
with reduction of
service of other
elements of the
infrastructure as a
result of the loss of
this facility.

Interdependency

Costs








Benefits

Database of site
conditions
Update site
conditions
database



Communication
equipment
compatibility
Redundancy
Increased
coordination
Study
requirements
beyond the
immediate
project area
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Applies to manmade and
natural disasters
Encourage
asset hardening
by other parties

Applies to manmade and
natural disasters
Improvements
to alternative
modes
Encourages
multi-modal
consideration to
meet needs

Table 5-2 (Continued)
Security Evaluation Criteria
Criteria
Maintenance

Operations

Evaluation
Costs associated
with additional
maintenance of
protective
measures.
Costs associated
with additional
operations of
protective
measures.

Costs







Increased
maintenance
costs over the
life of the
infrastructure
Infrastructure
Human
resources
Equipment
Training

Benefits







Vulnerability

Community
Impact

Impact associated
with a change in
vulnerability of an
asset as a result of
the developed
alternatives. This is
a qualitative factor
that can be
assessed as Low,
Medium, or High for
comparative
purposes.
Impact to
community function
and integrity. This
is a qualitative
factor that can be
assessed as Low,
Medium, or High for
comparative
purposes.





Assessment
Resolution
Tracking





Hazards
Analysis
Monitoring of
public concerns
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Accurate
budgeting
Efficient funding
allocation
Accurate
budgeting and
allocation
Effective
communication
Increase
responsiveness
Applies to manmade and
natural disasters
Decrease
vulnerability
Encourage
asset hardening
by other parties.

Public
acceptance of
project
Ability to
accurately
access impacts

5.4

Revised Finalization Phase
The distribution of the environmental documentation for review should be

modified to include certain agencies (Figure 5-18). The agencies that should be
included are shown in Table 5-1.

Figure 5-18
Environmental Document Review Modification
Deficiency: All Draft Environmental Impact Statements (DEIS) and
Final Environmental Impact Statements (FEIS) are circulated to a
determined group of government agencies for their review. These
agencies address the historical aspects of transportation planning but
do not adequately provide input from those agencies concerned with
transportation security.

Security Solution: Security experts from several agencies should be
involved in the review of these significant projects.

Benefit: This will ensure review by qualified personnel.
concerns will not fall victim to lack of resources.

Security

A security document should be developed to adequately document the
decision making process as related to transportation security (Figure 5-19).
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Figure 5-19
Security Documentation Modification
Deficiency: There is no mechanism, document, or report that is
currently produced to chronicle the decisions that were made on
alternatives development, analysis, and selection with regards to
transportation security. This cannot be accomplished in the traditionally
published documents such as the PER or the environmental document
due to the sensitive nature of the information.

Security Solution: Develop a technical memorandum or report entitled
“Security Assessment Report” (SAR) to fully document the decisionmaking process for security based decisions. This information would
then become a controlled informational items treated similarly to bridge
reports.

Benefit: This will document decision making process related to security
concerns and allow reproduction of those decisions at a later date.

5.5

Revised Informational Phase
Security experts should receive final distribution of the final environmental

and security documentation (Figure 5-20). The distribution list should include
those listed in Table 5-1.
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Figure 5-20
Final Distribution Modification
Deficiency: The final version of the Environmental Document is sent to
reviewing agencies for their files and for incorporation into their
planning efforts. However, security experts from several agencies are
not currently on the distribution list.

Security Solution: Security experts from several agencies should be
involved in the distribution list for the final environmental documents.

Benefit: This will ensure review by qualified personnel.
concerns will not fall victim to lack of resources.

5.6

Security

Revised Public Involvement Considerations
Revisions to the Public Involvement Process should be made that would

allow adequate response by the public (Figure 5-21).
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Figure 5-21
Public Involvement Modification
Deficiency: With the widespread diversity of the Florida population,
there is a strong interest in accommodating the needs of both the
Spanish and English-speaking populations in the state. Therefore, all
transportation initiatives must consider the influence of these
population characteristics prior to implementation of any new
processes or strategies that are likely to impact the population as a
whole. Most importantly, transportation planners must involve the
general public in some aspects of the development process as a means
of identifying new areas of influence and the overall direction of
transportation throughout the state.

Security Solution: Security measures that lead to implementation must
evolve slowly, taking the population and their needs into consideration,
such as language barriers and tourist limitations. Therefore, security
enhancements must be well publicized throughout all transportation
channels as a means of promoting these changes in all areas of the
state. Transportation users must experience a sense of confidence and
support for these initiatives, and if they are introduced gradually to the
general public, their impact will be even greater and more widespread.

Benefit: Will allow solutions that meet the needs of a multi-cultural state
where growth and tourism can dramatically change the face public
opinion over a short period of time.

An education program should be developed to train project personnel on
process for security information dissemination (Figure 5-22).
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Figure 5-22
Information Dissemination Modification
Deficiency: The challenge with regards to transportation security is in
the discussion of how much and what kind of information can be
revealed to the public in order to convince them that the best, most
secure, alternative is being chosen. This has to be done without
violating any federal or state laws with regards to secure information
dissemination.

Security Solution: Efforts should be made during the implementation of
the entire public involvement phase to screen information for
appropriateness. In order to educate staff, training should be
conducted that will inform them of the appropriate types of information
that can be given to the public. Also, all information should be reviewed
by appropriate security personnel prior to being released to the public or
media. This should occur at project milestones which may include the
community awareness memorandum, a public information meeting, a
project website, a project newsletter, or a public hearing.

Benefit: This will increase information security and standardize,
through education and process, information dissemination.

The modified PD&E process described in this chapter will enable
practitioners to adequately consider security in the project development process.
The cost of implementation will be minimal.

These changes can be

accomplished in a short time frame without jeopardizing the existing methods
and results.

121

Chapter 6
Findings And Next Steps

6.1

Key Findings

Based upon this research effort, there are three (3) key findings. The
most critical findings include the criteria to evaluate a project based upon
security, the necessity for adequate participation by other federal agencies, and
the consideration of public opinion and input into the modified process. These
findings were based upon exhaustive efforts to determine the most critical needs
and opportunities that lie in the existing process, thereby enabling realistic
integration of security considerations with minimal change to the existing
organizational culture. After completion of this research effort, a vetting phase
ensued wherein the reasonableness and effectiveness of the modified process
was discussed with transportation practitioners in Florida.

Based upon

conversations with leading transportation officials with the FDOT and private
security consultants, there is a distinct need for security considerations in the
development process and it is expected that there will be great interest in
implementation of the modified process.

The inoculation of security into the

project development process will take time to mature and take on a stable form in
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the long term process, but this research effort, based upon post-research
interviews, seems to be a necessary step in accomplishing those goals.

6.1.1 Security Evaluation Criteria

This research effort has resulted in a project security evaluation toolbox
that can be immediately applied to Florida’s project development process with
minimal efforts. The sixteen (16) evaluation criteria will allow project participants
to practically evaluate the reasonableness and feasibility of projects within a
security framework. They will provide a means to accurately estimate potential
impacts, both social and economic, associated with both man-made and natural
disasters.

These assessments will allow accurate budgeting and efficient

allocation of resources. These new criteria will sensitize planners to the security
needs of transportation projects and will result in decreased vulnerability and
increased safety and security.

6.1.2 Agency Review Involvement

A critical factor to the success of this modified project development
process lies in the willingness and ability for key agencies and personnel to
participate in the process. The basic requirement that projects be reviewed by
qualified, competent staff that has access to the information they need to
properly and accurately review projects is paramount. This need exists in every
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phase of the modified process. The effectiveness of the modified process cannot
be realized if we depend on other disciplines (i.e. safety, engineering) to
determine applicability of security accommodations during the development
process. The modified process gives an efficient venue in which agencies can
readily

participate

with

minimal

resource

commitment.

The

phased

implementation process allows acclimation and adequate preparation during the
move towards full utilization.

6.1.3 Revision/Clarification Of Public Involvement

Security is a public issue. It is impossible to properly consider security in
the project development process without fully considering the impact of public
participation in the process, especially when the process mandates public
involvement. The selection of the preferred project or the viability of project need
can be controlled by public opinion alone, as long as a safety issue is not
involved. It is imperative that, during the modified project development process,
we continue to involve the public and make the process as transparent as
possible. The modified process does not change the requirements for public
involvement; it simply adds another focal point for practitioners. The efforts to
involve and educate the public of security consideration during project
development must continue, especially when Floridians are struggling to
understand all of the implications that security has on their daily lives. These
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efforts will manifest themselves in the project evaluation and selection process, in
public workshops and hearings, and in other efforts to inform the public.

6.2

Next Steps
This research effort can be applied immediately in order to consider

security in Florida’s project development process. As the topic of security and
planning continue to develop at a rapid pace, so will the needs for continued
efforts along this line of study.

These needs will include validation of the

process, implementation efforts, future research needs, participation by local
governments, and application of revised processes.

6.2.1 Validation

There are three apparent methods to validate the revised process. One
method would include the use of a panel of experts to review the existing and
modified processes and comment on its utility and effectiveness. This panel
could consist of FDOT PD&E personnel, representatives from the federal
agencies involved in transportation planning and security (Appendix F),
designated security personnel from the local and state governments, and
recognized national security experts.

The panel would provide important

feedback in order to further develop the process. However, there will be a great
reluctance on the part of local, state, and federal agencies to officially review and
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comment on the procedure due to perceived endorsement and the liability
associated with that perception.

During the course of this study, this

phenomenon was experienced several times and would therefore be expected to
occur during implementation.
Another method that could be used to validate the model would be to
exhume completed projects, apply the revised process, and determine what
changes would occur in the process and where those changes happened. This
would allow further development of the process and possibly determine certain
threshold criteria for implementation of the process. However, the only way in
which this would work would be to have the additional federal security agencies
(Table 5-1) participate in the process as if this were a new project. The likelihood
of this occurring, given the resource challenges of most federal agencies, would
be remote. Most of those agencies expend all of their resources interacting with
current projects and could not afford to invest additional resources in past
projects.

Participation would be minimal and would therefore not prove

informational.
A final method would be the use of pilot projects along with a phased
implementation plan. This would allow governmental entities to participate in an
official capacity, within the boundaries of their duties and responsibilities, and be
expending resources on active projects.
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This method would prove the most

realistic and proper way to advance this research effort to the next level of
analysis.

6.2.2 Implementation

Implementation of new policies and procedures occurs through pilot
projects in Florida. There have been several other initiatives, like ETDM and ITS,
that have followed the same process and have been successfully implemented
within the state. It is expected that the revised project development process
would follow this same path. It is envisioned that a certain number of sample
projects would begin to utilize the new process on an annual basis with the
ultimate intent of widespread utilization in the next 3 to 5 years. The mitigating
factor of the revised process is that it does alleviate or relieve practitioners from
fulfilling the requirements of the existing process. This means that if a problem
occurs on a pilot project, the existing system can be used to complete the project
as normal.
Organizational change, especially in the public sector, can sometimes
take long periods of time. This research effort was undertaken with the intent of
working within the existing organizational framework in order to reduce the
amount of change that needed to occur. This would allow greater acceptance of
the revised processes and allow immediate implementation at some scale. The
revised process does not require any new committees to be formed, new
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software to be developed, new infrastructure to be acquired, or any new
employees to be hired. The greatest amount of change that will be required will
lie in changing the thought processes of those conducting the studies. There will
be additional efforts and energy expended for the increased coordination and
communication, but no additional expertise is required for this to occur. The
changes to existing chapters of the PD&E Manual are minimal, with only form
changes and additional procedure integration to occur.
Attention will have to be given to participation by the additional federal
agencies. As it stands, there would be little motivation for them to expend the
additional efforts to review large numbers of projects above their normal
workloads.

The phased implementation plan will help reduce the amount of

additional review time and personnel needed at the onset of the program. The
FDOT should encourage the lead federal agency, typically the FHWA or FTA, to
encourage participation by its sibling federal agencies. This encouragement from
other agencies and the implied liability associated with the reluctance to
participate in such an important program should generate sufficient interest and
response to the program. It is also noted that many of the federal agencies could
easily and quickly determine if they had any facilities involved with the proposed
project through the use of the online ETDM screening tool. ETDM would provide
them with location information and they could quickly discount involvement of
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certain agencies. For example, the CBP could readily determine an assessment
of no involvement if the project did not involve a national border.

6.2.3 Future Research Needs

This research is the initial effort at incorporating security considerations
into the project development process.

In order to fully develop and deploy

security to our nation’s infrastructure, additional research must be done. There
must be additional research on the integration of technology into the process to
allow detection, deterrence, and response. The public involvement process must
be reviewed for determination of adequate public education and involvement
levels. The interaction of land use with security and transportation networks
must be explored.

Methods and costs of hardening existing and proposed

infrastructure must be developed. Funding priorities must be established and a
funding implementation plan written.

A system of metrics should be developed

in order to allow planners to accurately estimate costs and impacts associated
with security considerations. The legal ramifications of security concerns must
be structured to include responsibility and liability.

6.2.4 Local Participation

The revised process does not require a dramatic increase in resource
needs from the local government agencies. Since the revised process works
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within the existing process, little new resources are required. There are already
several initiatives underway by local governments to inventory and assess critical
infrastructure and security sensitive sites within their geographic area of
responsibility.

However, in order to make the revised process efficient and

effective, there is a minimum amount of data that would need to be collected.
The minimum data to be collected would consist of location and descriptions of
those facilities, both existing and planned, listed in Table 6-1. This data should
be collected and made available in some electronic format, preferably as a GIS
layer.
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Table 6-1
Minimum Data Collection
1. Bridges
2. Tunnels
3. Essential interchange structures
4. Technological or other monitoring infrastructure
5. Traffic management centers
6. Telecommunications networks or hubs
7. Utilities, such as power or natural gas
8. Tourist attractions
9. Public transportation networks and hubs
10. Transportation networks
11. National landmarks
12. Industrial sites, such as chemical or nuclear plants
13. Commercial traffic hubs, such as container ports
14. Significant environmental protection areas
15. Water supplies
16. Banking and financial institutions
17. Agricultural/Food producing facilities
6.2.5 National Applicability Of Research

There are two elements of application that must to be addressed. The first
is that of spatial transferability and the second is that of application transferability.
The Florida Project Development Process is sometimes used as a model of a
complete and thorough satisfaction of the requirements of NEPA. The nature of
the PD&E manual is that of a framework for addressing the necessary elements
of NEPA. The PD&E Manual was developed as an agreement between the
FHWA and the FDOT and reflects satisfaction of NEPA for roadway projects.
The PD&E Manual does not present a detailed prescription of quantitative and
qualitative factors. Instead, it establishes the process and allows the user to
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apply industry standards, standard practice, and local conditions to the
formulation of reasonable and feasible alternatives and the selection of a
preferred alternative.

Because of this, the process lends itself to easy

transference to any other state in the nation. All states must comply with NEPA
and, because of the flexibility of the process in accommodating site specific
conditions, this revised process can be employed effectively anywhere. This
flexibility also allows the process to be applied to different modes. Even though
the process in Florida is commonly used for roadway facilities, this method would
prove effective for any mode of transportation. It could even be used for private
developments to include sites and facilities.
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Appendix A: Acronyms
Table A-1
List Of Acronyms
AASHO

American Association of State Highway Officials

AASHTO

American Association of State Highway and Transportation
Officials

AN

Advance Notification

APTA

American Public Transportation Association

ASCE

American Society of Civil Engineers

ASME

American Society of Mechanical Engineers

ASTM

American Society for Testing and Materials

ATA

American Trucking Association

BTS

Bureau of Transportation Statistics

CAAA

Clean Air Act Amendment of 1990

CATEX

Categorical Exclusion

CBP

Customs and Border Protection

CDR

Corridor Development Report

CE

Categorical Exclusion

CEI

Construction Engineering & Inspection

CEMO

Central Environmental Management Office

CEQ

Council on Environmental Quality

COA

Class of Action
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Appendix A (Continued)
Table A-1 (Continued)
List Of Acronyms
Consultation

Consultation means that one party confers with another
identified party and, prior to taking action(s), considers that
party's views.

Cooperation

Cooperation means that the parties involved in carrying out
the planning, programming and management systems
processes work together to achieve a common goal or
objective.

Coordination

Coordination means the comparison of the transportation
plans, programs, and schedules of one agency with related
plans, programs and schedules of other agencies or entities
with legal standing, and adjustment of plans, programs and
schedules to achieve general consistency.

CPDR

Corridor Planning and Design Report

CRAS

Cultural Resource Assessment Survey

CSER

Contamination Screening Evaluation Report

CTAA

Community Transportation Association of America

CTBSSP

Commercial Truck and Bus Safety Synthesis Program

CUTR

Center for Urban Transportation Research

DEIS

Draft Environmental Impact Statement

DEMO

District Environmental Management Office

DHS

Department of Homeland Security

EA

Environmental Assessment
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Appendix A (Continued)
Table A-1 (Continued)
List Of Acronyms
EIS

Environmental Impact Statement

ESBA

Endangered Species Biological Assessment

EST

Environmental Screening Tool

ETAT

Environmental Technical Advisory Team

FAA

Federal Aviation Administration

FBI

Federal Bureau of Investigation

FCMP

Florida’s Coastal Management Program

FEIS

Final Environmental Impact Statement

FEMA

Federal Emergency Management Agency

FHWA

Federal Highway Administration

FMCSA

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration

FRA

Federal Railroad Administration

FTA

Federal Transit Administration

FTP

Florida Transportation Plan

FY

Fiscal Year

GIS

Geographic Information Systems

HSIP

Highway Safety Improvement Program

ISTEA

Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991
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Appendix A (Continued)
Table A-1 (Continued)
List Of Acronyms
ITE

Institute of Transportation Engineers

ITS

Intelligent Transportation System

LBR

Legislative Budget Request

LHR

Location Hydraulics Report

MARAD

Maritime Administration

MIS

Major Investment Study

MPO

Metropolitan Planning Organization

NCHRP

National Cooperative Highway Research Program

NEPA

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969

NHTSA

National Highway Transit Research and Development
Program

NMSA

Non-Major State Action

NRCS

Natural Resource Conservation Service

NSA

National Security Agency

NTSB

National Transportation Safety Board

OFW

Outstanding Florida Waterway

OST

Office of the Secretary

PD&E

Project Development & Environment

PDO

Program Development Office
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Appendix A (Continued)
Table A-1 (Continued)
List Of Acronyms
PER

Preliminary Engineering Report

PHMSA

Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

Plan

Transportation Plan

PPP

Public-Private Partnerships

Programmatic

Type 1 Categorical Exclusion

PSR

Pond Siting Report

RITA

Research and Innovative Technology Administration

SAE

Society of Automotive Engineers

SEIR

State Environmental Impact Report

SLSDC

Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation

STB

Surface Transportation Board

STIP

Statewide Transportation Improvement Program

STRAHNET

Strategic Highway Network

TCRP

Transit Cooperative Research Program

TEA-21

Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century

TIP

Transportation Improvement Program

TRB

Transportation Research Board

TSA

Transportation Security Administration

154

Appendix A (Continued)
Table A-1 (Continued)
List Of Acronyms
TSI

Transportation Safety Institute

TSM

Transportation System Management

USDOT

United States Department of Transportation

USF

University of South Florida

VOLPE

John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center

WER

Wetlands Evaluation Report
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Appendix B: List Of State Security Contacts
Table B-1
List Of State Security Contacts
Alabama

Transportation Planning
Engineer

Alabama Department Of
Transportation

Alaska

Planning and Program
Administrator

Alaska Department of
Transportation and Public
Facilities

Arizona

Director

Arizona Department Of
Transportation

Arkansas

Director

Arkansas State Highway and
Transportation Department

California

Division Manager

California Department Of
Transportation

Colorado

Manager

Colorado Department Of
Transportation

Connecticut

Chief

Connecticut Department Of
Transportation

Delaware

Director

Delaware Department Of
Transportation

District of
Columbia

Chief

District of Columbia Department
Of Transportation

Florida

Director

Florida Department Of
Transportation

Florida

District Planning Manager

Florida Department Of
Transportation

Florida

Director of Production

Florida Department Of
Transportation
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Appendix B (Continued)
Table B-1 (Continued)
List Of State Security Contacts
Florida

District Planning Manager

Florida Department Of
Transportation

Florida

District Planning and
Environmental Engineer

Florida Department Of
Transportation

Florida

Director of Planning and
Public Transportation

Florida Department Of
Transportation

Florida

District Planning Manager

Florida Department Of
Transportation

Florida

District Planning, Public
Transportation, and
Florida Department Of
Environmental Management Transportation
Manager

Florida

District Planning Manager

Florida Department Of
Transportation

Florida

District Director of
Operations

Florida Department Of
Transportation

Florida

District Director of Planning
& Production

Florida Department Of
Transportation

Florida

District Public
Transportation Manager

Florida Department Of
Transportation

Florida

District Public
Transportation Manager

Florida Department Of
Transportation

Florida

District Public
Transportation Manager

Florida Department Of
Transportation
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Appendix B (Continued)
Table B-1 (Continued)
List Of State Security Contacts
Florida

District Director of Planning
& Production

Florida Department Of
Transportation

Florida

District Director of Planning
& Production

Florida Department Of
Transportation

Florida

District Modal Development
Administrator

Florida Department Of
Transportation

Florida

District Planning and Public
Transportation Manager

Florida Department Of
Transportation

Florida

District Planning and Public
Transportation Manager

Florida Department Of
Transportation

Florida

District Director of Planning
& Production

Florida Department Of
Transportation

Florida

District Public
Transportation Manager

Florida Department Of
Transportation

Florida

District Director of Planning
& Production

Florida Department Of
Transportation

Florida

District Director of Planning

Florida Department Of
Transportation

Florida

Assistant Secretary for
Intermodal Systems
Development

Florida Department Of
Transportation

Florida

Manager

Florida Department Of
Transportation
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Appendix B (Continued)
Table B-1 (Continued)
List Of State Security Contacts
Florida

Project Development
Engineer

Florida Department Of
Transportation

Florida

District Secretary

Florida Department Of
Transportation

Florida

Executive Director

Florida Department Of
Transportation

Florida

Manager, District
Florida Department Of
Environmental Management
Transportation
Office

Florida

District Project
Development Engineer

Florida Department Of
Transportation

Florida

Modal Development
Administrator

Florida Department Of
Transportation

Florida

Emergency Coordination
Officer

Florida Department Of
Transportation

Georgia

State Transportation
Planning Administrator

Georgia Department Of
Transportation

Hawaii

State Transportation
Administrator

Hawaii Department Of
Transportation

Idaho

Public Involvement
Coordinator

Idaho Department Of
Transportation

Illinois

Director

Illinois Department Of
Transportation
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Appendix B (Continued)
Table B-1 (Continued)
List Of State Security Contacts
Indiana

Chief

Indiana Department Of
Transportation

Iowa

Director

Iowa Department Of
Transportation

Kansas

Director

Kansas Department Of
Transportation

Kentucky

Secretary

Kentucky Transportation Cabinet

Louisiana

Assistant Secretary

Louisiana Department Of
Transportation and Development

Maine

Director

Maine Department Of
Transportation

Maryland

Director

Maryland Department Of
Transportation

Massachusetts Director

Massachusetts Department Of
Transportation

Michigan

Director

Michigan Department Of
Transportation

Minnesota

Director

Minnesota Department Of
Transportation

Mississippi

Director

Mississippi Department Of
Transportation

Missouri

Transportation Program
Manager

Missouri Department Of
Transportation
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Table B-1 (Continued)
List Of State Security Contacts
Montana

Planning Administrator

Montana Department Of
Transportation

Nebraska

Division Manager

Nebraska Department Of Roads

Nevada

Deputy Director

Nevada Department Of
Transportation

New
Hampshire

Administrator

Department Of Transportation

New Jersey

Assistant Commissioner

New Jersey Department Of
Transportation

New Mexico

Director

New Mexico Highway and
Transportation Department

New York

Director

New York Department Of
Transportation

New York

Director

New York Department Of
Transportation

North Carolina

Manager

North Carolina Department Of
Transportation

North Dakota

Director

North Dakota Department Of
Transportation

Ohio

Deputy Director

Ohio Department Of
Transportation

Oklahoma

Division Engineer

Oklahoma Department Of
Transportation
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Appendix B (Continued)
Table B-1 (Continued)
List Of State Security Contacts
Oregon

Planning and Research Unit
Manager

Oregon Department Of
Transportation

Pennsylvania

Planning Deputy Secretary

Pennsylvania Department Of
Transportation

Pennsylvania

Researcher

Volpe Center

Puerto Rico

Director

Puerto Rico Department Of
Transportation

Rhode Island

Deputy Chief Engineer

Rhode Island Department Of
Transportation
South Carolina Department Of
Transportation

South Carolina Planning Engineer
South Dakota

Planning and Programs
Manager

South Dakota Department Of
Transportation

Tennessee

Chief

Tennessee Department Of
Transportation

Texas

Director

Texas Department Of
Transportation

Utah

Director

Utah Department Of
Transportation

Vermont

Director

Vermont Department Of
Transportation

Virginia

Chief

Virginia Department Of
Transportation
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Appendix B (Continued)
Table B-1 (Continued)
List Of State Security Contacts
Washington

Transportation Planning
Manager

Washington Department Of
Transportation

Washington
DC

Director

FHWA

West Virginia

Director

West Virginia Department Of
Transportation

Wisconsin

Director

Wisconsin Department Of
Transportation

Wyoming

Director

Wyoming Department Of
Transportation
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Appendix C (Continued)
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Appendix C (Continued)

166

Appendix D: State Responses To Inquiry Letter
Connecticut
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Appendix D (Continued)
Indiana
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Appendix D (Continued)
New York

Oregon
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Appendix D (Continued)
Georgia
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Appendix D (Continued)
Florida

171

Appendix D (Continued)
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Appendix D (Continued)
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Appendix D (Continued)
Ohio
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Appendix E: Key Transportation Legislation
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)

In 1969 Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).
The law was in response to increased concern for the natural environment. This
is the primary legislation that has shaped today’s Project Development &
Environment (PD&E) process in Florida. This Act satisfied the following goals:


Created the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)



Created basic requirements of Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) which
must be prepared an all major Federal actions that significantly affect the
environment.



Established a national environmental policy



Required federal agencies to use an interdisciplinary approach in planning
and decision-making for any actions affecting the environment.



The creation of the CEQ was a major product of NEPA and has several
primary functions which include:



Creation of environmental policy



Monitoring of environmental policy



Preparation of reports concerning status of environmental quality



Monitoring of all federal involvement in NEPA
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The NEPA process regiments the alternatives development and selection
process by mandating that certain areas of analysis occur. Compliance with
NEPA is mandated when at least one of the following occurs:


Federal support will be required for any single phase of the project. This
support would most likely come in the form of funding.



There is the possibility that federal support may be needed for a project and
there is a need to maintain the eligibility of the project.



Federal permits may be required. An example may be a United States Coast
Guard permit for a new bridge crossing over a navigable waterway.



Generally, federal approval of the project may be necessary.

Federal agencies can include the Federal Highway Administration
(FHWA), the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA).

A

significant amount of guidance has been developed concerning the intent of the
NEPA process.

However the approach to implementation often varies

substantially. Many states have adopted umbrella policies or procedures under
which they apply the NEPA process.

Federal agencies involved in the

sponsorship of projects within these states have supported the guidelines for
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each state and have developed a list of criteria that must be met for a project to
be considered for federal funding.

Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA)

The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA)
implemented broad changes in the way governments plan for all modes of
surface transportation. The objective of ISTEA was to improve the performance
of transportation systems by making transportation decisions with due
consideration for social, economic, and environmental factors early in the
planning process, coordinate planning efforts among affected agencies, and
involve the public earlier in the decision-making process.

This legislation

established many of the alternative evaluation criteria that are required in
Florida’s PD&E process.

Security concerns alone are not a primary focus.

ISTEA involved many aspects of the transportation process that had not been
previously considered. ISTEA considered the following:


System preservation, rather than new systems became a priority.



Acknowledged changing patterns in metropolitan areas in areas of
development, economics, and cultural diversity and established stronger
coordination and control for those areas.
177

Appendix E (Continued)


Dictated a more integrated planning process.



Increased emphasis on stakeholder participation in the process, especially
the public.



Increased awareness of expansion constraints of the transportation network
in highly urbanized or developing areas and the need for intermodal
considerations.



Created a direct link between transportation improvements to the Clean Air
Act Amendment of 1990 (CAAA) and state air quality plans.



Provided for a more flexible funding approach to transportation projects.
Traditionally, there was little flexibility between funding sources for highway
and transit projects. The possibility of moving monies between these two
areas greatly increased.



Required State Departments of Transportation (DOT) and Metropolitan
Planning Organizations (MPO) develop cost feasible long-term and short-term
transportation improvement plans based upon forecast revenues.

Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century

On June 9, 1998, the President signed into law Public Law 105-178, the
Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) authorizing highway,
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highway safety, transit and other surface transportation programs for the next 6
years. Subsequent technical corrections in the TEA 21 Restoration Act have
been incorporated; thus, the material presented here reflects the combined
effects of both Acts and the two are jointly referred to as TEA-21.

TEA-21 builds on the initiatives established in the Intermodal Surface
Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA), which was the last major
authorizing legislation for surface transportation. This new Act combines the
continuation and improvement of current programs with new initiatives to meet
the challenges of improving safety as traffic continues to increase at record
levels, protecting and enhancing communities and the natural environment as we
provide transportation, and advancing America’s economic growth and
competitiveness domestically and internationally through efficient and flexible
transportation.

Significant features of TEA-21, that are reflected in Florida’s project
programming and development processes, include:


Assurance of a guaranteed level of Federal funds for surface transportation
through FY 2003. The annual floor for highway funding is keyed to receipts of
the Highway Account of the Highway Trust Fund (HTF). Transit funding is
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guaranteed at a selected fixed amount. All highway user taxes are extended
at the same rates when the legislation was enacted.


Extension of the Disadvantaged Business Enterprises (DBE) program,
providing a flexible national 10 percent goal for the participation of
disadvantaged business enterprises, including small firms owned and
controlled by women and minorities, in highway and transit contracting
undertaken with Federal funding.



Strengthening of safety programs across the Department of Transportation
(DOT). New incentive programs, with great potential for savings to life and
property, are aimed at increasing the use of safety belts and promoting the
enactment and enforcement of 0.08 percent blood alcohol concentration
standards for drunk driving. These new incentive funds also offer added
flexibility to States since the grants can be used for any Title 23 U.S.C.
activity.



Continuation of the proven and effective program structure established for
highways and transit under the landmark ISTEA legislation. Flexibility in the
use of funds, emphasis on measures to improve the environment, focus on a
strong planning process as the foundation of good transportation decisions—
all ISTEA hallmarks—are continued and enhanced by TEA-21. New programs
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such as Border Infrastructure, Transportation Infrastructure Finance and
Innovation, and Access to Jobs target special areas of national interest and
concern.


Investing in research and its application to maximize the performance of the
transportation system. Special emphasis is placed on deployment of
Intelligent

Transportation

Systems

to

help

improve

operations

and

management of transportation systems and vehicle safety.


Maintained ISTEA program structure and decision-making processes;



Increased Federal funding levels and guaranteed annual funding;



Stressed simplification and streamlining of transportation decision-making
processes; and



Established seven planning factors for consideration in Statewide and
metropolitan planning processes.

SAFETEA-LU

On August 10, 2005, the President signed into law (Public Law 109-59)
the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for
Users. This federal transportation law provided funding for highway and transit
improvement through the year 2009. According to a brochure published by the
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Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT September 2005), this new law
provides the following:


Approximately $2 billion per year for transportation funding



Increased return on federal gas tax dollars



Protection of the Efficient Transportation Decision Making Process



Additional transit services



Increased funding on safety



It also modified some of the existing planning requirements for both
Metropolitan and Statewide Planning (FDOT, August 17, 2005).

Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) are required to develop longrange transportation plans (LRTP) and transportation improvement programs
(TIPs). The MPO process was changed as follows:


Provided additional funding sources for planning



Changed the existing 7 planning factors into 8 factors by separating safety
and security into 2 distinct factors



Added requirements to the Long Range Plan for discussion of mitigation and
consultation.
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In Florida, changed the Long Range plan update cycle from every 3 years to
every 5 years.



Modified the period for the TIP from 3 year coverage with a 2 year update
cycle to 4 year coverage with a 4 year update cycle.



Extended the federal certification of Transportation Management Areas
(TMAs) from 3 years to at not less than every 4 years.

The State of Florida is required to develop long-range statewide
transportation plans and statewide transportation improvement programs (STIP).
The statewide planning process was changed as follows:


Changed the existing 7 planning factors into 8 factors by separating safety
and security into 2 distinct factors



Modified the Long Range Statewide Transportation Plan to require more
consultation with State, tribal, and local agencies



Modified the period for the STIP from 3 year coverage with a 2 year update
cycle to 4 year coverage with a 4 year update cycle.

The 8 planning factors now include the following:
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1. support the economic vitality of the metropolitan area, especially by
enabling global competitiveness, productivity, and efficiency;
2. increase the safety of the transportation system for motorized and
nonmotorized users;
3. increase the security of the transportation system for motorized and
nonmotorized users;
4. increase the accessibility and mobility of people and for freight;
5. protect and enhance the environment, promote energy conservation,
improve

the

quality

of

life,

and

promote

consistency

between

transportation improvements and State and local planned growth and
economic development patterns;
6. enhance the integration and connectivity of the transportation system,
across and between modes, for people and freight;
7. promote efficient system management and operation; and
8. Emphasize the preservation of the existing transportation system.

184

Appendix F: Transportation Planning And Security Agencies
United States Department of Transportation (USDOT)

The United States Department of Transportation was established by an
act of Congress on October 15, 1966. Their mission is to “Serve the United
States by ensuring a fast, safe, efficient, accessible and convenient
transportation system that meets our vital national interests and enhances the
quality of life of the American people, today and into the future.” (USDOT 2006)
The USDOT contains several organizations that include the Office of the
Secretary (OST), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA), the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
(FMCSA), the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), the Federal Transit
Administration (FTA), the Maritime Administration (MARAD), the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the Pipeline & Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), the Research and Innovative
Technology Administration (RITA), The Saint Lawrence Seaway Development
Corporation (SLSDC), and the Surface Transportation Board (STB).

Office of the Secretary (OST)

The OST oversees the formulation of national transportation policy and
promotes intermodal transportation.

Other duties include negotiation and

implementation of international transportation agreements, assuring the fitness of
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United States airlines, enforcing airline consumer protection regulations,
issuance of regulations to prevent alcohol and illegal drug abuse in transportation
systems and preparing transportation legislation.

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

The FAA is responsible for the safety of all civil aviation in the United
States. Their mission statement is that “Our mission is to provide the safety,
most efficient aerospace system in the world.” Their vision is to “…improve the
safety and efficiency of aviation, while being responsive to our customers and
accountable to the public.” (FAA 2006) The duties of the FAA include:


issuance and enforcement of regulations and standards relating to the
manufacture, operation, certification, and maintenance of aircraft



certification and rating program for airmen and airports serving air carriers



oversees the program to protect the security of civil aviation



enforces regulations under the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act for air
shipments



operates a network of air towers, air route and traffic control centers and flight
service stations



develops air traffic rules
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allocates use of air space



provides for security control of air traffic to meet national defense
requirements



construction/installation of electronic and visual aids to air navigation and
safety



licenses commercial and private space launch facilities
In the aftermath of the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United

States, primary responsibility for civil aviation security was transferred to the
newly created Transportation Security Administration.

Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)

The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) is an agency of the United
States Department of Transportation (USDOT). The FHWA is tasked with the
safety and technological status of the nation’s roadway network. The FHWA
typically provides funding to state and local agencies in support of the
maintenance of the roadway network.

Their funding is directed towards two

programs; (1) state and local governments and (2) the Federal Lands Highway
funding for national parks and forests. The Vision statement of the FHWA is
“Improving Transportation for a Strong America.” Their mission is “Enhancing
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Mobility through Innovation, Leadership, and Public Service.” (FHWA 2006)
Their strategic goals include:


Safety



Mobility and Productivity



Global Connectivity



Environment



National Homeland Security



Organizational Excellence

They also state they have a few “Vital” priorities that include Safety,
Congestion Mitigation, and Environmental Stewardship and Streamlining.

By

these statements, it can be seen that the FHWA has a strong emphasis on safety
and also somewhat of security. The safety program is focused on reducing the
42,000 traffic crash related deaths each year in the United States. However, it is
apparent that security concerns are not yet considered “Vital” in the nation’s
primary, roadway focused, organization.

As security concerns continue to

become more prevalent, it is expected that these concerns would mandate
additional resources.
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Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA)

The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration was established as a part
of the Department of Transportation by the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act
of 1999 (Public Law No. 106-159, 113 Statute 1748, December 9, 1999). The
FMCSA historically was a part of the FHWA.

The FMCSA’s mission is to

“…reduce crashes, injuries, and fatalities involving large trucks and buses.” It is
based in Washington, D.C. and currently employs over 1,000 people.

The FMCSA’s strategy to carry out its mission involves:


Development and enforcement of regulations which balance motor carrier
safety with efficiency.



Use of safety information systems to identify high risk carriers and to focus of
enforcement of safety regulations.



Implementation of training and educational programs for carriers, drivers, and
the public.



Partnership with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and motor
carrier specific groups.
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The key programs of the FMCSA are:


Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs)



Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMRs)



Commercial Driver’s License Program



Motor Carrier Safety Identification and Information Systems



Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP)



Performance & Registration Information Systems Management (PRISM)



Research and Technology (R&T)



Border and International Safety



Safety Education and Outreach



Household Good Program

Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)

The FRA was created by the Department of Transportation Act of 1966
(49 USC 103, Section 3(e)(1)). The FRA promotes safe and environmentally
sound rail transportation. It has the responsibility for railroad safety throughout
the United States.

It employs safety inspectors to enforce federal safety

standards which include track maintenance, inspection, and operation issues. It
also conducts research and development to evaluate projects for safety
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compliance. It also administers an education program for highway-rail grade
crossing and trespassing on rail property.

The FRA operates through its seven offices.

These offices include

Administration and Finance, Chief Counsel, Civil Rights, Policy, Public Affairs,
Railroad Development, and Safety. The Office of Safety promotes and regulates
safety throughout the Nation’s railroad industry. Its inspectors focus on 5 safety
disciplines. These safety disciplines include: Track, Signal and Train Control,
Motive Power and Equipment, Operating Practices, Hazardous Materials, and
Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Safety. (FRA 2006)

Federal Transit Administration (FTA)

The FTA assists in developing mass transportation systems for cities and
communities. FTA helps to plan, build, and operate transit systems, primarily
through grant programs.

Their primary mission is to “Improve public

transportation for America’s communities.” (FTA 2006) Their 3 core values are
Excellence, Leadership, and Community.

They deal with all types of public

transportation including buses, rail vehicles, ferryboats, trolleys, inclined railways,
subways, and people movers. The FTA has 4 strategic goals which include:
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Attract and retain the best people



Deliver products and services that are valued by FTA customers



Establish effective business processes and leverage technology



Position public transportation as the mode of choice in America

They also have 4 Core Accountabilities which include:


Transit Ridership Growth



Safety and Security Readiness



Major Project Cost Control



Grant Processing Efficiency

Maritime Administration (MARAD)

The MARAD serves to promote development and maintenance of an
adequate, well-balanced, United States merchant marine that is sufficient to carry
the United States’ domestic waterborne commerce and a substantial portion of it
waterborne foreign commerce. It also has the capability to serve as a naval and
military auxiliary in time of war or a national emergency. MARAD also ensures
that the Nation has adequate shipbuilding and repair service, efficient ports,
effective intermodal water and land transportation systems, and reserve capacity.
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The mission of MARAD is

“To strengthen the U.S. maritime transportation system - including
infrastructure, industry and labor - to meet the economic and
security needs of the Nation. MARAD programs promote the
development and maintenance of an adequate, well-balanced
United States merchant marine, sufficient to carry the Nation’s
domestic waterborne commerce and a substantial portion of its
waterborne foreign commerce, and capable of service as a naval
and military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency. MARAD
also seeks to ensure that the United States maintains adequate
shipbuilding and repair services, efficient ports, effective intermodal
water and land transportation systems, and reserve shipping
capacity for use in time of national emergency.” (MARAD 2006)

Its goals include commercial mobility, national security, the environment,
organizational excellence, and vision. Their national security goal focuses on
assuring an intermodal sealift capacity to support vital national security interests.
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National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)

The NHTSA is responsible for reducing deaths, injuries and economic
losses resulting from motor vehicle crashes. They determine and enforce safety
performance standards for motor vehicles and equipment.

The NHTSA

responsibilities include:


investigation of safety defects



establishment and enforcement of fuel economy standards



assistance to states and communities to reduce the threat from drunk drivers



promotion of the use of safety belts, child safety seats and air bags



investigation of odometer fraud



establishment and enforcement of vehicle anti-theft regulates



Consumer information on motor vehicle safety.

Their mission statement is to “Save lives, prevent injuries and reduce
economic costs due to road traffic crashes, through education, research, safety
standards and enforcement activity.” (NHTSA 2006) They are dedicated to
achieving the highest standards of safety through its core values of Integrity,
Service, and Leadership.
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Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)

The PHMSA was created through the Norman Y. Mineta Research and
Special Programs Improvement Act (Public Law 108-426) on November 30th,
2004. The PHMSA oversees the safety of more than 800,000 daily shipments of
hazardous materials in the Nation and about 64 percent of the Nation’s energy
transported by pipelines.

They are tasked to eliminate transportation related

deaths and injuries related to hazardous materials and pipeline transportation.
They also promote programs that enhance communities and protect the natural
environment. Their emphasis is on safety. Their safety focus is defined as
follows:


Hazardous Materials Safety Risk Management



Hazardous Materials Safety International Standards



Pipeline Compliance and Safety



Pipeline Damage Prevention



Pipeline Safety Research and Development

The PHMSA focuses on 2 programs, hazardous materials and pipeline
safety. They have an active education and training program to educate industry,
transportation system operators, and governments. They use cooperation with
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industry, academia, professional associations and government to facilitate the
education and training programs.

Another key role is that of regulation. The

PHMSA’s Office of Hazardous Materials Safety develops regulatory standards for
classifying, handling and packaging of daily shipment of hazardous materials
within the United States. The Office of Pipeline Safety ensures safety in the
design, construction, operation and maintenance, and spill response to 2.3
million miles of pipelines.

Research and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA)

RITA as formed under the Norman Y. Mineta Research and Special
Programs Improvement Act (Public Law 108-426, 2004).

Their mission is

centered on the desire to advance DOT priorities for innovation and research in
transportation technologies and concepts.

These concepts would improve

mobility, promote economic growth, and deliver a better integrated transportation
network. They focus on collaboration, information sharing, coordination, support,
and advocacy.
Center.

RITA includes the Volpe National Transportation Systems

The Volpe Center is dedicating to enhancing the effectiveness,

efficiency, and responsiveness of other Federal organizations with critical
transportation functions and mission.
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Transportation Statistics and the Transportation Safety Institute and the
University Transportation Centers program, such as the Center for Urban
Transportation Research (CUTR) located at the University of South Florida
(USF).

John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center

The Volpe Center is a center for transportation and logistics expertise.
The Center helps decision makers solve transportation related problems through
research and development, engineering, and analysis.

Their work includes

projects that involve multiple modes and disciplines. Their vision is “To be a
world-recognized Center of excellence, a leader for innovation and a forum for
government, industry, and academic cooperation in the development and
improvement of transportation and logistics systems.” (Volpe 2006) Their mission
is “To anticipate future national, state, local and international transportation and
logistic issues and requirements, to develop tools and technologies addressing
them for our clients, and to be a catalyst for innovation in transportation
technologies and management processes to make the transportation system
safer and more effective and efficient.” (Volpe 2006)

197

Appendix F (Continued)
Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS)

The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991
established BTS for data collection, analysis, and reporting and to ensure the
most cost-effective use of transportation monitoring resources. The mission of
BTS is “…to lead in developing transportation data and information of high
quality, and to advance their effective use in both public and private
transportation decision making.” Their vision is that their “Data and information
of high quality will support every significant transportation policy decision, thus
advancing the quality of life and economic well being of all American.” (BTS
2006) The strategic goals of the BTS include Relevance, Quality, Timeliness,
Comparability, Completeness, and Utility.

Transportation Safety Institute (TSI)

The TSI was established in 1971 to assist the DOT accomplish their
training needs. The TSI develops and conducts worldwide safety, security, and
environmental training, products, and services for both public and private sectors.
The training offered by TSI includes transit, aviation, pipeline, motor carrier,
highway safety, hazardous material, and risk management. The divisions of the
TSI include Aviation Safety Division, The Coast Guard Inspection Training &
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Assistance Team, The Hazardous Materials Division, The Highway Safety
Division, The Pipeline Safety Division, the Special Programs Division, and the
Transit Safety & Security Division.

Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation (SLSDC)

The SLSDC was created on May 13, 1954. The SLSDC operates and
maintains a safe, reliable and efficient waterway for commercial and non
commercial vessels between the Great Lakes and the Atlantic Ocean.

The

SLSDC works in conjunction with the Saint Lawrence Seaway Authority of
Canada to oversee operations safety, vessel inspections, traffic control, and
navigation aids on the Great Lakes and the Saint Lawrence Seaway.

Surface Transportation Board (STB)

The STB was created by the Interstate Commerce Commission
Termination Act (ICCTA) of 1995 (Public Law 104-88). The STB is an economic
regulatory agency responsible for:


resolving railroad rate and service issues



rail restructuring transactions to include mergers, line sales, construction, and
line abandonment
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certain trucking company, moving van, and non-contiguous ocean shipping
company rate matters



certain intercity passenger bus company structure, financial, and operational
matters



rates and services of certain pipelines not regulated by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission

The STB is divided into the Office of Compliance and Enforcement, the
Office of Congressional and Public Services, the Office of Economics,
Environmental Analysis and Administration, the Office of Proceedings, and the
Office of General Counsel.

Transportation Research Board (TRB)

The TRB is a unit of the National Research Council (NRC). The NRC is
charged to serve as an independent advisor to the federal government and
others on scientific and technical questions of national importance. The mission
of the TRB “is to promote innovation and progress in transportation through
research.” (TRB 2006)

The TRB acts as an information clearinghouse of

transportation practice and policy, stimulates research and offers research

200

Appendix F (Continued)
management services that promote technical excellence, and provides “expert”
advisory services.

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

The DHS was formed as part of the Homeland Security Act of 2002
(Public Law 107-296).

The DHS provides the main mass for the variety of

national organizations and institutions involved in national security efforts. Their
mission is “We will lead the unified national effort to secure America. We will
prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to threats and
hazards to the nation. We will ensure safe and secure borders, welcome lawful
immigrants and visitors, and promote the free-flow of commerce.”

(DHS 2006)

Their strategic goals include Awareness, Prevention, Protection, Response,
Recovery, Service, and Organizational Excellence. Three agencies comprise the
DHS. These include the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Customs
and Border Protection (CBP), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA).
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Transportation Security Administration (TSA)

The TSA was created in direct response to the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001 as part of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
(Public Law 107-71) that was enacted on November 19, 2001. The mission of
the TSA is to protect the nation’s transportation network through ensuring
movement of people and goods. The TSA is also responsible for security at the
nation’s airports. It strives to set the standard in transportation security.

Customs and Border Protection (CBP)

The CBP is a part of the DHS. Their mission is to protect our borders
against terrorism.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

FEMA was formally organized on July 20, 1979 by President Jimmy Carter
(Executive Order 12148). FEMA’s mission is “to lead the effort to prepare the
nation for all hazards and effectively manage federal response and recovery
efforts following any national incident. FEMA also initiates proactive mitigation
activities, trains first responders, and manages the National Flood Insurance
Program and the U.S. Fire Administration.” (FEMA 2006)
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Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)

The CEQ was established within the Executive Office of the President by
Congress as a part of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and
supplemental responsibilities were added by the Environmental Quality
Improvement Act of 1970. The CEQ coordinates federal environmental efforts
and works closely with agencies and other White House offices in the
development of environmental policies and initiatives. The CEQ reports to the
President of the United States annually on the state of the environment, oversees
federal agency implementation of the environmental impact assessment process,
and acts as a referee when other agencies disagree over the adequacy of
assessments.

National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

The NTSB was created on April 1, 1967. The NTSB is a federal agency
that is responsible for investigating and recommending corrective actions for
every civil aviation accident in the United States and for “significant” accidents for
other modes. In addition, the NTSB conducts special studies of safety issues of
“national significance.” The NTSB does not regulate transportation equipment,
personnel,

or

operations

nor

does
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recommendations have achieved an 82 percent adoption rate with over 12,000
recommendations being adopted.

Private Organizations

There are a large number of private organizations involved in the
transportation planning process.

The key players are the American Public

Transportation Association (APTA), the American Association of State Highway
and Transportation Officials (AASHTO), and the Institute of Transportation
Engineers (ITE) and their general roles in transportation planning are discussed
in the following sections.

American Public Transportation Association (APTA)

The APTA is a private organization that focuses on advocacy in
Washington, coordination of meetings and conferences, training and education,
industry information clearinghouse services, data collection and dissemination,
and an awards and recognition provider for the Public Transportation Industry.
Their mission statement is “To strengthen and improve public transportation,
APTA serves and leads its diverse membership through advocacy, innovation,
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and information sharing.” (APTA 2006) They currently have 6 strategic goals
which include:


Ridership



Economic Vitality



Advocacy



Image



People and Organizations



Safety and Security



Association Development

Their fifth goal, Safety and Security, has 5 desired outcomes.

These

include:


Enhanced public confidence in the safety and security of public transportation



Programs to encourage safer and more secure public transportation systems



Sustained development and implementation of industry standards



Programs and services on standards and effective safety practices for public
transportation systems.



Full engagement of the public transportation industry in shaping government
safety and security policies and programs
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Their strategies for accomplishing these outcomes include:


Maintain regular communication with members regarding APTA and industry
safety and security resources and initiatives.



Continue the exchange of effective safety and security practices through
committees, conferences, and workshops.



Educate governmental security agencies and facilitate partnerships with them
to foster responsiveness to industry and user needs.



Continue to develop operational and cost-effective industry standards that
promote safety and security.



Assess APTA’s safety audit program and identify opportunities for
improvement.



Continue to promote the vital role of public transportation in local and regional
emergency preparedness.



Identify, promote, and encourage the use of industry best practices for safety
and

security

initiatives

developed

in

partnership

with

governmental

organizations.


Facilitate partnerships to develop and implement innovative responses to
transit security threats.
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The American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials
(AASHTO)

The American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials
(AASHTO) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization representing highway and
transportation departments in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto
Rico. Their mission is to advocate transportation policies and provide technical
services to support agencies to efficiently and safely move people and goods.

Institute of Transportation Engineers (ITE)

The ITE was founded in 1930 as a private multimodal professional
international organization. Its membership is comprised of professional who are
responsible for meeting society’s needs for safe and efficient surface
transportation through planning efforts, system design, system implementation,
and operation and maintenance of networks.
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